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Abstract
Methods for learning optimal policies in autonomous agents often assume that the way
the domain is conceptualised—its possible states and actions and their causal structure—
is known in advance and does not change during learning. This is an unrealistic assump-
tion in many scenarios, because new evidence can reveal important information about
what is possible, possibilities that the agent was not aware existed prior to learning.
We present a model of an agent which both discovers and learns to exploit unforeseen
possibilities using two sources of evidence: direct interaction with the world and com-
munication with a domain expert. We use a combination of probabilistic and symbolic
reasoning to estimate all components of the decision problem, including its set of ran-
dom variables and their causal dependencies. Agent simulations show that the agent
converges on optimal polices even when it starts out unaware of factors that are critical
to behaving optimally.
1. Introduction
Consider the following decision problem from the domain of crop farming (inspired
by Kristensen and Rasmussen (2002)): Each harvest season, an agent is responsible for
deciding how best to grow barley on the land it owns. At the start of the season, the
agent makes some decisions about which grain variety to plant and how much fertiliser
to use. Come harvest time, those initial decisions affect the yield and quality of the
crops harvested. We can think of this problem as a single-stage (or “one-shot”) decision
problem, in which the agent chooses one action based on a set of observations, then
receives a final reward based on the outcome of its action.
Suppose the agent has experience from several harvests, and believes it has a good
idea of the best seeds and fertiliser to use for a given climate. One harvest, something
totally unexpected happens: Despite choosing what it thought were the best grains and
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fertiliser, many of the crops have come out deformed and of poor quality. A neighbouring
farmer tells the agent the crops have been infected by a fungus that spreads in high
temperatures, and that the best way to protect crops in future is to apply fungicide. The
agent must now revise its model of the environment and its reward function to account for
fungus (a concept it previously was not aware of), extend its available actions to include
fungicide application (an action it previously did not realise existed), reason about the
probabilistic dependencies these new concepts have to the ones it was already aware of,
and reason about how they affect rewards.
This example illustrates at least three challenges, the combination of which typically
is not handled by current methods for learning optimal decision policies (we defer a
detailed discussion of related work to Section 6):
• In addition to starting unaware of the probabilistic dependency structure of the
decision problem, the agent starts unaware of even the true hypothesis space of
possible problem structures, including the sets of possible actions and environment
variables, and their causal relations.
• Domain exploration alone might not be enough to discover these unknown factors.
For instance, it is unlikely the agent would discover the concept of fungus or the
action of fungicide application by just continuing to plant crops. External expert
instruction is necessary to overcome unawareness.
• An expert might interject with contextually relevant advice during learning, not
just at the beginning of the problem. Further, that advice may refer to concepts
which are not a part of the agent’s current model of the domain.
In the face of such strong unawareness, one might be tempted to side-step learning
an explicit model of the problem, and instead learn optimal behaviour directly from
the data. Deep reinforcement learning (e.g. Mnih et al. (2015)) has proved extremely
useful for learning implicit representations of large problems, particularly in domains
where the input sensory streams are complex and high-dimensional (e.g computer vision).
However, in many such models, the focus of attention for abstraction and representation
learning is on perceptual features rather than causal relations (see, e.g., Pearl (2017))
and other decision-centric attributes. For instance, in works such as by Chen et al.
(2015), who demonstrate an end-to-end solution to the problem of autonomous driving,
the decisions are not elaborated beyond “follow the lane” or “change lanes” although
significant perceptual representation learning may need to happen in order to work with
the predicate “lane” within the raw sensory streams. For safety critical decisions, or ones
involving significant investment (e.g. driving a car, advising on a medical procedure,
deciding on crops to grow for the year) it is important 1 that a system can explain the
reasoning behind its decisions so the user can trust its judgement.
We present a learning agent that, in a complementary approach to representation
learning in batch mode from large corpora, uses evidence and a reasoning mechanism to
incrementally construct an interpretable model of the decision problem, based on which
optimal decision policies are computed. The main contributions of this paper are:
1As evidenced by significant recent interest from agencies interested in the application of AI, e.g., the
DARPA Explainable AI programme DARPA-BAA-16-53 (2016)
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• An agent which, starting unaware of factors on which an optimal policy depends,
learns optimal behaviour for single-stage decision problems via direct experience
and advice from a domain expert. The learning uses decision networks to represent
beliefs about the variables and causal structure of the decision problem, providing
a compact and interpretable model. Crucially, the agent can revise all components
of this model, including the set of random variables, their causal dependencies, and
the domain of the reward function (Section 4).
• A communication framework via which an expert can offer both solicited and un-
solicited advice to the agent during learning: that is, the expert advice is offered
piecemeal, in reaction to the agent’s latest attempts to solve the task, rather than
all of it being conveyed prior to learning. Messages from the expert can include
entirely new concepts which the agent was previously unaware of, and provide
important qualitative information to complement the quantitative information con-
veyed by statistical correlations in the domain trials (Section 3.2).
• Experiments across a suite of randomly generated decision problems, which demon-
strate that our agent can learn the optimal policy from evidence, even if it were
when initially unaware of variables that are critical to its success (Section 5).
The kinds of applications we ultimately have in mind for this work include tasks in
which there is a need for flexible and robust responses to a vast array of contingencies. In
particular, we are interested in the paradigm of continual (or life-long) learning (Silver,
2011; Thrun and Pratt, 2012), wherein the agent must continually and incrementally
add to its knowledge, and so revise the hypothesis space of possible states and actions
within which decisions are made. In this context, there is a need for autonomous model
management (Liebman et al., 2017), which calls for reasoning about what the hypothesis
space is, in addition to policy learning within those hypothesis spaces.
2. The Learning Task
We consider learning in single-stage decision problems. In these problems, the agent
chooses an action based on a set of initial observations, then immediately receives a
final reward based on the outcome of its action. Subsequent repetitions of the same
decision problem have mutually independent initial observations, and the immediate
reward depends only on the current action and its outcome. Solving the problem of
unforeseen possibilities for single-stage scenarios is a necessary first step towards the
long-term goal of extending this work to multi-stage, sequential decision problems.
To learn an optimal decision policy, the agent must compute which action will max-
imise its expected reward, given its observations of the state in which the action is to
be performed. Formally, the optimal action ~a∗ given observations ~e is the action which
maximizes expected utility :
~a∗ = arg max
~a∈v(A)
EU(~a|~e) = arg max
~a∈v(A)
∑
~s∈v(C)
Pr(~s|~a,~e)R(~s) (1)
Here, A = {A1, A2, . . . , An} is the set of action variables and C = {C1, C2, . . . , Cm}
is the set of chance variables (or state variables). An action ~a ∈ v(A) is an assignment
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to each of the action variables in A, such that ~a = (a1, a2, . . . , an) with a1 ∈ A1, a2 ∈ A2,
etc. (We use v(Q) to denote the Cartesian product of all sets in Q.) Similarly, a state
~s ∈ C is an assignment to each chance variable in C. The reward received in state ~s is
R(~s).
In our task, the agent faces the extra difficulty of starting unaware of certain actions
and concepts (i.e., chance variables) on which the true optimal policy depends. Conse-
quently, it begins learning with an incomplete hypothesis space. It also has an incorrect
model of the domain’s causal structure—i.e., there may be missing or incorrect depen-
dencies. Further, the learning agent will start with an incomplete or incorrect reward
function. The agent’s learning task, then, is to use evidence to converge on an optimal
policy, despite beginning with an initial model defined over an incomplete set of possible
states and actions and incorrect dependencies among them.
Since we are interested in interpretable solutions, our approach is that the learn-
ing agent uses evidence to dynamically construct an interpretable model of the decision
problem from which an optimal policy can be computed. Formally, we treat this task of
learning an optimal policy as one of learning a decision network (dn). dns capture pref-
erences with a numeric reward function and beliefs with a Bayes Net, thereby providing
a compact representation of all the components in equation (1).
Definition 1. Decision Network
A Decision Network (dn) is a tuple 〈C,A,Π, θ,R〉, where C is a set of chance
variables, A is a set of action variables (the agent controls their values), and
R is a reward function whose domain is ΠR ⊆ C and range is R.2 〈Π, θ〉 is a
Bayes Net defined over C ∪ A. That is, Π is a directed acyclic graph (dag),
defining for each C ∈ C its parents Πc ⊆ C ∪ A, such that C is conditionally
independent of (C ∪ A) \ Πc given Πc. θ defines for each variable C ∈ C its
conditional probability distribution θc = Pr(C|Πc).
A policy for a dn is a function pi from the observed portion ~e of the current state
(i.e., ~e is a subvector of v(C)) to an action v(A). As is usual with dns, any variable
X whose value depends on the action performed (in other words, X is a descendant of
A) cannot be observed until after performing an action. More formally, C = B ∪ O,
where the “before” variables B are non-descendants of A, and the “outcome” variables
O are descendants of A (i.e., where Π∗ is the closure of Π, X ∈ O iff ∃A ∈ A such that
A ∈ Π∗X). So a policy pi for the dn is a function from v(B′) to v(A), where B′ ⊆ B are
the observable variables in B.
Figure 1a shows a dn representation of the barley example from the introduction. The
action variables (rectangles) areA = {Grain,Harrow, Fungicide, Fertiliser, Pesticide},
the chance variables (ovals) are C = B∪O where B includes Precipitation, Temperature,
Soil Type etc. and O includes Y ield, Protein, Fungus, and Bad Press. The reward
domain is ΠR = {Y ield, Protein, Fungus,Bad Press}.
Our dn formulation has some similarities to influence diagrams (Howard and Math-
eson, 2005). In contrast to DNs, influence diagrams allow action nodes to have parents
via “information arcs” from chance nodes. While this feature is useful to model multi-
stage decision problems, we do not require it here since all action variables are assigned
simultaneously.
2 Agents do not have intrinsic preferences over actions, but rather over their outcomes.
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Our agent will incrementally learn all components of the dn, including its set of
random variables, dependencies and reward function. We denote the true dn by dn+,
and the agent’s current model of the dn at time t as dnt. A similar convention is used
for each component of the dn (so, for instance, At is the set of action variables the agent
is aware of at time t). Thus, we compute an update function dnt = update(dnt−1, et),
where et is the latest body of evidence and the dns dnt−1 and dnt may differ in any
respect. Figure 1b gives an example of an agent’s possible starting model dn0 for the
barley example.
Notice that dn0 is missing factors that influence the optimal policy defined by dn+
(e.g. it is unaware of the concept of fungus). It is also missing dependencies that are a
part of dn+ (e.g. it does not think the choice of grain has any influence on the amount
of crops that will grow). One usually assumes that all variables in a dn are connected to
the utility node because a variable that is not has no effects on optimal behaviour. So
the agent knows that dn+ is so connected, but dn+’s set of variables, causal structure
and reward function are all hidden and must be inferred from evidence.
We make four main assumptions to restrict the scope of the learning task:
1. The agent can observe the values of all the variables it is aware of (so the domain
of its policy function at time step t is v(Bt)). However, it cannot observe a chance
variable’s values at times before it was aware of it, even after becoming aware of it—
i.e. the agent cannot re-perceive past domain trials upon discovering an unforeseen
factor.
2. The agent cannot perform an action it is unaware of. Formally, if X ∈ A+ but
X 6∈ At, then the fully aware expert perceives the learning agent’s action as en-
tailing X = 0 (plus other values of other variables in A+). This differs from the
learning agent’s own perception of its action: X = 0 is not a part of the agent’s
representation of what it just did because it is not aware of X! Once the agent
becomes aware of X, then knowing that inadvertent actions are not possible, it
can infer all its past actions entail X = 0. This contrasts with chance variables,
whose values at times when the agent was unaware of them will always be hidden.
Clearly, this assumption does not hold across all decision problems (e.g. an agent
might inadvertently lean on a button, despite not knowing the button exists). If we
wished to lift this assumption, we could simply treat action variable unawareness in
the same way as we treat chance variable unawareness (as described in Section 4).
3. The set of random variables in the agent’s initial dn dn0 is incomplete rather than
wrong: that is, B0 ⊆ B+, O0 ⊆ O+ and A0 ⊆ A+. Further, the initial domain
of R is a subset of its true domain: i.e., Π0R ⊆ Π+R. This constraint together with
the dialogue strategies in Section 3.2 simplify reasoning: dn updates may add new
random variables but never removes them; and may extend the domain of R but
never retracts it. However, the causal structure Π and reward function R can be
revised, not just refined.
4. The expert has complete knowledge of the actual decision problem dn+ but lacks
complete knowledge of dnt—the learning agent’s perception of its decision problem
at time t. Further, we make the expert cooperative—her advice is always sincere,
competent and relevant (see Section 3.2 for details).
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Figure 1: The graphical component of the dn for the “Barley” problem. Action variables are represented
by rectangles, chance variables by ovals, and the reward node by a diamond.
Any competent agent attempting this learning task should obey two key principles:
Consistency: At all times t, dnt should be consistent. That is, Πt should be a dag
defined over the vocabulary Ct∪At, θt should abide by the basic laws of probability,
andRt should be a well-defined function that captures an asymmetric and transitive
preference relation over Ct.
Satisfaction: Evidence is informative about what can happen (however rarely), not just
informative about likelihood. At all times t, dnt should satisfy all the possibilities
that are entailed by the observed evidence so far.
Consistency is clearly desirable, because anything can be inferred from an inconsistent
dn, making any action optimal. Satisfaction is not an issue in traditional approaches
to learning optimal policies, because evidence never reveals a possibility that is not
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within the hypothesis space of the learning agent’s initial dn. But in our task, without
Satisfaction, the posterior dn may fail to represent an unforeseen possibility that is
monotonically entailed by observed evidence. It would then fail to capture the unforeseen
possibility’s effects on expected utilities and optimal policy. Our experiments in Section 5
show that when starting out unaware of factors on which optimal policies depend, a
baseline agent that does not comply with Satisfaction performs worse than an agent that
does. We will say dnt is valid if it complies with Consistency and Satisfaction; it is
invalid otherwise.
A valid dn is necessary, but not sufficient: dnt should not only be valid, but in
addition its probabilistic component 〈Πt, θt〉 should reflect the relative frequencies in the
domain trials. Section 4 will define a dn update procedure with all of these properties.
The set of valid dns is always unbounded—it is always possible to add a random
variable to a valid dn while preserving its validity. So in addition to the above two
monotonic constraints on dn update, we adopt two intuitively compelling defeasible
principles that make dn update tractable. Indeed, the agent needn’t enumerate all valid
dns; instead, dn update uses the defeasible principles to dynamically construct a single
dn from evidence:
Minimality: The dn should have minimal complexity. In other words, its random
variables discriminate one possible state from another, two states have distinct
payoffs, and/or two factors are probabilistically dependent only when evidence
justifies this.
Conservativity: The agent should minimise changes to the dn’s hypothesis space when
observing new evidence.
Minimality is a form of Occam’s razor: make the model as simple as possible while
accounting for evidence. Conservativity captures the compelling intuition that you pre-
serve as much as possible of what you inferred from past evidence even when you have
to revise the dn to restore consistency with current evidence. Minimality and Conserva-
tivity underlie existing symbolic models of commonsense reasoning (Poole, 1993; Hobbs
et al., 1993; Alchourro´n et al., 1985), the acquisition of causal dependencies (Bramley
et al., 2015; Buntine, 1991) and preference change (Hansson, 1995; Cadilhac et al., 2015).
Our final desirable feature is to support active learning: to give the agent some
control over the evidence it learns from next, both from the domain trials (Section 3.1)
and the dialogue content (Section 3.2).
3. Evidence
We must use evidence to overcome ignorance about how to conceptualise the domain,
not just ignorance about likelihoods and payoffs. We regiment this by associating each
piece of evidence et with a formula δt that expresses (partial) information about the true
decision problem dn+, where δt follows monotonically from et, in the sense that it would
be impossible to observe et unless δt is true of the decision problem dn+ that generated
et. Thus δt is a partial description of a dn that must be satisfied by the actual (complete)
decision network dn+.
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We illustrate this with three examples. First, given the assumptions we made about
the relationship between the agent’s initial dn dn0 and dn+ (i.e., that B0 ⊆ B+, A0 ⊆ A+,
O0 ⊆ O+ and Π0R ⊆ Π+R), dn0 in Figure 1b yields the partial description δ0 given in (2):
{Grain, Fertiliser} ⊆ A+ ∧
{Soil Type, Precipitation} ⊆ B+ ∧
{Nitrogen,Gross Crops, Y ield, Protein} ⊆ O+ ∧
{Y ield, Protein} ⊆ Π+R
(2)
The second example concerns domain trials: suppose the agent is in a state where
it experiences the reward r and observes that the Y ield variable has value y and the
Protein variable has value p. Equation (3) must be true of dn+, where the domain of
quantification is dn+’s atomic states:
∃s(s→ y ∧ p ∧R+(s) = r) (3)
Thirdly, suppose the expert advises the agent to apply pesticide. Then, Pesticide ∈ A+
must be true.
We capture this relationship between a complete dn and formulae like (2) and (3) by
defining a syntax and semantics of a language for partially describing dns (details are in
the Appendix). Each model for interpreting the formulae δ in this language corresponds
to a unique complete dn, and dn |= δ if and only if δ (partially) describes dn. Where δt
represents the properties that a dn generating observed evidence et must have, dn+ |= δt
(because dn+ generated et), although other dns may satisfy δt too. This relationship
between dn+, et and δt enables the agent to accumulate an increasingly specific partial
description of dn+ as it observes more and more evidence: where e0:t−1 is the sequence
of evidence e1, . . . , et−1 and δ0:t−1 its associated partial description of dn+, observing
the latest evidence et yields e0:t with an associated partial description δ0:t that is the
conjunction of δ0:t−1 and δt. The agent will thus estimate a valid dn from evidence (as
defined in Section 2) under the following conditions:
1. δ0:t captures the necessary properties of a dn that generates e0:t
2. The agent’s model obeys this partial description. That is, dnt |= δ0:t
This section describes how we achieve the first condition; Section 4 defines how we
achieve the second, with Section 4.2 also ensuring that the probabilistic component
〈Πt, θt〉 reflects the relative frequencies in the domain trials.
3.1. Domain Evidence: Sample0:t
Domain evidence consists of a set of domain trials. In a domain trial τi, the agent
observes ~bi ∈ v(Bi), performs an action ~ai ∈ v(Ai), and observes its outcome ~oi ∈
v(Oi) and reward ri. From now on, for notational convenience, we may omit the vector
notation, or freely interchange vectors with conjunctions of their values. Each domain
trial therefore consists of a tuple:
Sample0:t = [〈bi, ai, oi, ri〉 : 0 < i ≤ t] (4)
8
The domain trial τi = 〈bi, ai, oi, ri〉 entails the partial description (5) of dn+: in words,
there is an atomic state s ∈ v(C+ ∪ A+) in dn+ that entails the observed values bi, ai
and oi and which has the payoff ri.
∃s((s→ (bi ∧ ai ∧ oi)) ∧R+(s) = ri) (5)
Formula (5) follows monotonically from τi because the agent’s perception of a domain
trial is incomplete but never wrong: the agent’s random variables have observable values,
and they are always a subset of those in dn+ thanks to the agent’s starting point dn0 and
the dialogue strategies (see Section 3.2). Thus, even if the agent subsequently discovers a
new random variable X, (5) still follows from τi, regardless of X’s value at time i (which
remains hidden to the agent). But on discovering X, tuples in (4) get extended—the
agent will observe X’s value in subsequent domain trials. Thus in contrast to standard
domain evidence, the size of the tuples in (4) is dynamic. We discuss in Section 4 how
the agent copes with these dynamics. The expert also keeps a record Sample+0:t of the
domain trials; these influence her dialogue moves (see Section 3.2). Her representation of
each trial is at least as specific as the agent’s because she is aware of all the variables—so
the size of the tuples in Sample+0:t is static.
Domain trials can reveal to the agent that its conceptualisation of the domain is
deficient. If there are two trials in Sample0:t with the same observed value for Π
t
R (i.e.,
the current estimated domain of the reward function) but the rewards are different, then
this entails that ΠtR is invalid. If Sample0:t contains two domain trials with the same
observed values for every chance variable Ct of which the agent is currently aware, but
the rewards are different, then the vocabulary Ct is invalid. Section 4 will define how the
agent detects and learns from these circumstances.
The agent’s strategy for choosing an action mixes exploitation and exploration in
an -greedy approach: In a proportion (1 − ) of the trials, the agent chooses what it
currently thinks is an optimal action. In the remainder, the agent chooses an action at
random.
3.2. Dialogue Evidence: D0:t
The interaction between the agent and the expert consists of the agent asking ques-
tions that the expert then answers, and unsolicited advice from the expert. All the
dialogue moves are about dn+, and the signals are in the formal language for partially
describing dns (see the Appendix), but with the addition of a sense ambiguous term,
which we motivate and describe shortly. The agent’s and expert’s lexica are different,
however: the agent’s vocabulary lacks the random variables in dn+ that it is currently
unaware of, and so the expert’s utterances may feature neologisms. As we said earlier, we
bypass learning how to ground neologisms (but see Larsson (2013); Forbes et al. (2015);
Yu et al. (2016)) by assuming that once the agent has heard a neologism, it can observe
its denotation in all subsequent domain trials.
The sense ambiguous term is wbt : its intended denotation is what the expert observes
about the state at time t before the agent acts—i.e., [[wbt ]] ∈ v(B+). But this denotation
is hidden to the agent, whose default interpretation is [[wbt ]] projected onto Bt—i.e., it
is restricted by the agent’s conceptualisation of the domain at time t. The expert uses
wbt to advise the agent of a better action than the one it performed at t. We will see
in Section 3.2.1 that using wbt in the expert’s signal minimises its neologisms, which
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makes learning more tractable. But hidden messages may create misunderstandings;
Section 3.2.2 describes how the agent detects and learns from them.
The agent and expert both keep a dialogue history: D0:t for the agent and D+0:t for
the expert. Each utterance in a dialogue history is a tuple 〈ωi, σi, µi〉, where ωi is the
speaker (i.e., either the expert or the learning agent), σi the signal, and µi its (default)
interpretation. Since wbi may be misinterpreted, µi and µ
+
i may differ and so µi is not
equivalent to δi—δi is the information about dn+ that follows from the signal σi whatever
the denotation of wbi might be. We will specify δi for each signal σi in Section 3.2.1.
3.2.1. The expert’s dialogue strategy
As noted earlier, the expert’s dialogue strategy is Cooperative: the message µ+ that
she intends to convey with her signal σ is satisfied by the actual decision problem dn+,
so that dn+ |= µ+. This makes her sincere, competent and relevant. In many realistic
scenarios, this assumption may be untrue (a human teacher, for example, might occa-
sionally make mistakes). We intend to explore relaxations of this assumption in future
work.
Further, the expert’s dialogue strategy limits the amount of information she is allowed
to send in each signal. There are two motivations for limiting the amount of information.
The first stems from the definition itself of our learning task; and the second is practical.
First, recall from Section 1 that we allow the expert advice to occur piecemeal, with
signals being interleaved among the learner’s domain trials. This is because a major aim
of our learning task is to reflect the kind of teacher-apprentice learning seen between
humans, where the teacher only occasionally interjects to say things that relate to the
learner’s latest attempts to solve the task. There are many tasks where an expert may be
incapable of exhaustively expressing everything they know about the problem domain,
but rather can only express relevant information in reaction to specific contingencies that
they experience.
The second, more practical motivation is to make learning tractable. The number
of possible causal structures Π is hyperexponential in the number of random variables
(Buntine, 1991). Prior work utilises defeasible principles such as Conservativity (Bramley
et al., 2015) and Minimality (Buntine, 1991) to make inferring Π tractable. However,
if the expert’s signal σt features a set N of variables that the agent was unaware of,
then the agent must add each variable in N to the causal structure Πt, and moreover by
Consistency and Satisfaction, each of these must be connected to Πt’s utility node. But
Πt−1 did not feature these variables at all, and so the number of maximally conservative
and minimal updates that satisfy this connectedness is hyperexponential in the size of
N . Thus, an expert utterance with many neologisms undermines the efficiency and
incrementality of learning.
We avoid this complexity by restricting all expert signals to containing at most one
neologism. Specifically, the expert must have conclusive evidence that the agent is aware
of all but one of the random variables that feature in her signal σ. The expert knows
the agent is aware of a variable X if: (a) X has already been mentioned in the dialogue,
either by her or by the agent; or (b) X is an action variable and the agent has performed
its positive value x (recall that inadvertent action is not possible):
Ce = {X ∈ C+ | ∃σi ∈ D+0:t : X ∈ σi}
Ae = {X ∈ A+ | ∃σi ∈ D+0:t : X ∈ σi or ∃τi ∈ Sample+0:t : x ∈ τi}
(6)
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Here, Ce and Ae respectively are the set of chance and action variables that the expert
knows the agent is aware of. The following principle, which we refer to as 1N, applies to
all the expert’s signals:
At Most One Neologism (1N): Each expert signal σ features at most one variable
from (A+∪C+)\ (Ae∪Ce) (i.e., at most one neologism). Furthermore, if σ features
such a variable X, then σ declares its type: i.e., σ includes the conjunct X ∈ B+,
X ∈ O+ or X ∈ A+, as appropriate.
The expert uses an ambiguous term wbt to comply with Cooperativity and 1N in
contexts where, without wbt , she would be unable express any advice. For instance,
assume that the expert’s knowledge of the agent’s “before” vocabulary is given by Be.
The expert would typically be unable to express that, given bt ∈ v(B+), the agent
should have performed an alternative action a′ to the action at that the agent actually
performed—by 1N, she cannot use the vector b+t ∈ v(B+) in her signal if |B+|− |Be| > 1.
If instead she were to use the vector bet , where b
e
t = b
+
t  Be (i.e., b+t projected onto Be),
then the resulting statement (7) may be false (and so violate Cooperativity), because
these expected utilities marginalise over all possible values of B+ \ Be, rather than using
their actual values:
EU(a′|bet ) > EU(at|bet ) (7)
Alternatively, by replacing bet in the signal (7) with the ambiguous term w
b
t , her intended
message becomes hidden but it abides by both Cooperativity and 1N.
The expert’s dialogue policy is to answer all the agent’s queries as and when they
arise, and to occasionally offer unsolicited advice about a better action. She does the
latter when two conditions hold:
(i) The agent has been behaving sufficiently poorly to justify the need for advice
(ii) The current context is one where she can express a better option while abiding by
Cooperativity and 1N.
Condition (i) is defined via two parameters γ and β: in words, the last piece of advice
was offered greater than γ time steps ago, and from then until now, the fraction of
suboptimal actions taken by the agent is greater than β. This is formalised in equation
(8), where t′ is the time of the last advice and a+,∗i is the optimal action given dn+
and b+i . In the experiments in Section 5, we vary γ and β to test how changing the
expert’s penchant for offering unsolicited advice affects the learning agent’s convergence
on optimal policies. Condition (ii) for giving advice is satisfied when the observed reward
rt is no higher than the expected payoff from the agent’s action a
+
t (equation (9)), and
there is an alternative action a′ with a higher expected payoff, which can be expressed
while complying with Cooperativity and 1N (equation (10)).
|t− t′| > γ ∧ |{a
+
i : t
′ ≤ i ≤ t and EU(a+i |b+i ) < EU(a+,∗i |b+i )}|
|t− t′| > β (8)
EU(a+t |b+t ) ≥ rt (9)
∃A∃a′(a′ ∈ v(Ae ∪ {A}) ∧ EU(a′|b+t ) ≥ EU(a+t  (Ae ∪ {A})|b+t )) (10)
11
When the context satisfies these conditions, then there are witness constants A and a′
that satisfy (10). These constants are used to articulate the advice: the expert utters (11),
where at is the expression formed by projecting the vector a
+
t ∈ v(A+) onto Ae ∪ {A}.
EU(a′|wbt ) > EU(at|wbt ) (11)
In our Barley example, the message (11) might be paraphrased as: in the current cir-
cumstances, it would have been better to apply pesticide and not use fertiliser than to
not apply pesticide and use fertiliser.
The agent’s default interpretation of (11) is (12), where bt ∈ v(Bt):∑
s∈Ct×At
Pr(s|a′, bt)R+(s) ≥
∑
s∈Ct×At
Pr(s|at, bt)R+(s) (12)
So 〈expert , (11), (12)〉 is added to D0:t. While the intended message of (11) is true (be-
cause (10) is true), (12) may be false, and so no monotonic entailments about probabili-
ties can be drawn from it. For example, in our Barley example, suppose that the agent’s
current model of the domain is Figure 1b, and the agent has observed soil type n and
precipitation c. Then the agent’s defeasible interpretation of the expert’s advice is that
it would have been better to apply pesticide (p) and not use fertiliser (¬f) (than to not
apply pesticide and use fertiliser) in any state where n ∧ c is true (note that relative to
the dn shown in Figure 1b, the expert mentioning applying pesticide leads it to discover
this entirely new action):∑
s∈Ct×At
Pr(s|p,¬f, n, c)R+(s) ≥
∑
s∈Ct×At
Pr(s|¬p, f, n, c)R+(s) (13)
But this (defeasible) interpretation could be false: the expert’s (true) intended message
may have been that p ∧ ¬f is better in a much more specific situation: one where not
only is n ∧ c true, but also the local concern is low and the insect prevalence is high
(in other words, the probabilities in (13) should have been conditioned on ¬l and i as
well). However, (11) and the mutually known dialogue policy monotonically entails (14),
whatever the true referent for wbt might be.
∃s((s→ (a′ ∧ bt)) ∧R+(s) > rt) (14)
So (14) is added to δ0:t, and for dnt to be valid it must satisfy it; similarly for A ∈ A+.3
In our example, the agent adds (15) to δ0:t:
∃s((s→ (p ∧ ¬f ∧ n ∧ c)) ∧R+(s) > rt) (15)
Thus the expert’s unsolicited advice can result in the agent discovering an unforeseen
action term A (in this case, adding pesticide) and/or prompt a revision to the reward
function Rt, which in turn may reveal to the agent that its conceptualisation of the
domain is deficient (just as (5) may do).
3Our learning algorithms in Section 4 do not exploit the (defeasible) information about likelihood
that is expressed in (12); that is a matter for future work.
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Figure 2: Information flow when updating a dn with the latest evidence. Diamonds are tests and
rectangles are processes.
3.2.2. The agent’s dialogue strategy
The agent aims to minimise the expert’s effort during the learning process, and so asks
a question only when dn update fails to discriminate among a large number of dns. In
this paper, we identify three such contexts (as shown in Figure 2): (i) Misunderstandings;
(ii) Unforeseen Rewards; and (iii) Unknown Effects. We now describe each of these in
turn.
Misunderstandings. The agent checks whether the (default) interpretation of the cur-
rent signal is consistent with those of prior signals; when they are inconsistent, the agent
knows there has been a misunderstanding (because of Cooperativity). For instance, sup-
pose Bt = ∅—so the agent assumes [[wbi ]] = > for all i  t—and the expert advised
EU(a|wbt−n) > EU(a′|wbt−n) and EU(a′|wbt ) > EU(a|wbt ). The agent’s default interpre-
tations of these signals fails the consistency test. Thus the agent infers that it is unaware
of a B variable, but does not know its name. If the agent were to guess what variable
to add, then learning would need to support retracting it on the basis of subsequent evi-
dence, or reason about when it is identical to some subsequent factor the agent becomes
aware of. This is a major potential complexity in reasoning and learning. We avoid it by
defining a dialogue strategy that ensures that the agent’s vocabulary is always a subset
of the true vocabulary. Here, that means the agent asks the expert for the name of a
B variable. In words, question (16) expresses: what is different about the state before I
acted just now and the state before I acted n time steps ago?4
?λV (V ∈ B+ ∧ value(V, t− n) 6= value(V, t)) (16)
4Strictly speaking, answers to this question are partial descriptions of the domain trials Sample+0:t as
well as dn+. The formal details of this are straightforward but tedious, so we gloss over it here.
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This signal uses a standard representation for questions (Groenendijk and Stokhof,
1982): ? is an operator that maps a function to a set of propositions (the true answers),
and the function’s arguments correspond to the wh-elements of the question (which,
what etc). Its semantics, given in the Appendix, follows (Asher and Lascarides, 2003):
a proposition is a true answer if and only if it substitutes specific individual(s) for the
λ-term(s) to create a true proposition—so “something” is not an answer but “nothing”
is an answer, corresponding to the empty set. An answer can thus be non-exhaustive—it
needn’t include all the referents that satisfy the body of the λ-expression.
The agent’s policy for when to ask (16) guarantees that it has a true positive answer.
By the 1N rule, the expert’s answer includes one variable, chosen at random if there is
a choice. E.g., she answers with the signal X ∈ B+; so X ∈ B+ is added to δ0:t. In our
barley example, the answer might be, for instance, “the temperature was high”, where
the concept “temperature” is a neologism to the learning agent.
The agent now knows that its default interpretations of prior signals that feature wbi
(i ≺ t) are incorrect—on learning X ∈ B+, it now knows that these terms do not denote
>. But the agent cannot observe the correct interpretation. Testing whether subsequent
messages are consistent with prior messages would thus involve reasoning about past
hidden values of X, which would be complex and fallible. For the sake of simplicity, we
avoid it: if the agent discovers a new B-variable at time t, then she ceases to test whether
subsequent messages µt+m are consistent with past ones µt−m′ (m,m′ ≥ 0). In effect,
the agent “forgets” past signals and their (default) interpretations, but does not forget
their monotonic consequences, which are retained in δ0:t.
Unforeseen rewards. The current reward function’s domain, ΠtR, may be too small to be
valid (see Sections 2 and 3.1). If the agent were to guess what variable to add to ΠtR, then
learning would need to support retracting it on the basis of subsequent evidence—this is
again a major potential complexity in reasoning and learning. Instead, when the agent
infers ΠtR is too small (we define how the agent infers this in Section 4), the agent seeks
monotonic evidence for fixing it by asking the expert (17):
?λV (V ∈ Π+R
∧
X∈ΠtR
V 6= X)
(17)
For instance, in the barley domain, this question could express something like “Other
than having a high yield and high protein crops, what else do I care about?” to which
the answer might be “You care about bad publicity”. This is a true (non-exhaustive)
answer, even though the agent (also) cares about avoiding outbreaks of fungus.
Non-exhaustive answers enable the expert to answer the query while abiding by Co-
operativity and the 1N rule. But they also generate a choice on which answer to give.
The expert’s choice is driven by a desire to be informative: she includes in her answer
all variables in Π+R that she knows the agent is aware of (i.e., the variables Y ∈ Ce ∩Π+R)
and one potential neologism (i.e., X ∈ (C+ \ Ce) ∩Π+R) if it exists, with priority given to
a variable whose value is different in the latest trial τt from a prior trial τt′ that had the
same values as τt on all the variables mentioned in the query (17) but a different reward.
If her answer includes a potential neologism, then by 1N she declares its type.
For example, let Πt−1R = {O1, O2} and Π+R = {O1, O2, O3, O4, O5}. Suppose that
O3 ∈ Ce but O4, O5 6∈ Ce. Now suppose that the latest trial τt entails o1,¬o2 and reward
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of 1, but a prior trial entails o1,¬o2 and a reward of 0.5. Then even if O3 has different
values in these trials, the agent does not infer (defeasibly) that O3 ∈ Π+R. Rather, she asks
(17): i.e., ?λV (V ∈ Π+R ∧ V 6= O1 ∧ V 6= O2). The expert’s answer includes O3 because
O3 ∈ Ce∩Π+R. In addition, she can mention either O4 or O5, but not both (because of 1N).
Suppose that τt entails o4 and a prior trial with a different reward entails o1 ∧¬o2 ∧¬o4.
However, O5 lacks this property. Then her answer is: O3 ∈ Π+R ∧O4 ∈ Π+R ∧O4 ∈ O+.
The ambiguous term wbt is not a part of the expert’s answer, and so the message is
observable—indeed, it is the same as the signal. This becomes a conjunct in δ0:t, and
so in our example, for dnt to be valid it must satisfy O4 ∈ ΠtR and O4 ∈ Ot (and so
ΠtR ⊃ Πt−1R and if O4 truly was a neologism to the agent then Ot ⊃ Ot−1 as well).
Section 4 defines how to estimate a valid dnt from this evidence.
Unknown Effects. There are contexts where the search space of possible causal structures
remains very large in spite of the defeasible principles for restricting it, in which case the
agent asks a question whose answer will help to restrict the search space:
?λV (X ∈ ΠV ) (18)
In words, what does X affect? For instance, in the barley domain, it might express:
What does the temperature affect? (to which an answer might be the risk of weeds).
In Section 4 we will define precisely the contexts in which the agent asks this question,
including which variable X it asks about. The expert’s answer X ∈ Π+Y gives priority to
a variable Y that she believes the agent is unaware of. This increases the chances that
the agent will learn potentially valuable information about the hypothesis space.
The expert’s answer X ∈ Π+Y has an observable interpretation; X ∈ Π+Y is added to
δ0:t and since dnt |= δ0:t, X ∈ ΠtY . Thus some dependencies in Πt are inferred mono-
tonically via observable expert messages. Others are inferred defeasibly via statistical
pattern recognition in the domain trials (see Section 4).
4. The Model for Learning
We now define dn update in a way that meets the criteria from Section 2. We must
estimate all components of the dn from the latest evidence et, in a way that satisfies the
partial description δ0:t that has accumulated so far (this is required to make the dn valid).
That is, one must estimate the set of random variables Ct and At, the domain ΠtR ⊆ Ct
of the reward function as well as the function Rt itself, the dependencies Πt among
Ct ∪ At, and the conditional probability tables (cpts) θt, given Πt. These components
are estimated from the prior dn dnt−1, the latest evidence et and the partial description
δ0:t in the following order, as shown in Figure 2:
1. (a) Estimate Bt, Ot, At and ΠtR;
(b) Estimate Rt, given ΠtR;
2. (a) Estimate Πt, given Bt ∪ Ot ∪ At and ΠtR;
(b) Estimate θt, given Πt.
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Step 1 proceeds via constraint solving (see Section 4.1); step 2 via a combination of
symbolic and statistical inference (see Section 4.2). Update proceeds in this order because
the set of dependencies one must deliberate over depends on the set of random variables
it is defined over, and the global constraint on dependencies—namely, that the utility
node is a descendant of all nodes in the dn—must be defined in terms of the domain ΠtR
of the reward function. Likewise, the set of cpts θt that one must estimate is defined
by the dependency structure Πt. The search for a valid dn can prompt backtracking,
however: e.g., failure to derive a valid dependency structure Πt may ultimately lead to
a re-estimate of the set of random variables Bt ∪ Ot ∪ At. We now proceed to describe
in detail each of these components of dn update.
4.1. Random Variables and Reward Function
The first step in dn update is to identify dnt’s random variables—that is, the sets
Bt, Ot and At—and the reward function Rt. This is achieved via constraint solving,
with the constraints provided by δ0:t.
The number of valid vocabularies is always unbounded, because any superset of a
valid vocabulary is valid. As motivated in Section 2, we make search tractable via greedy
search for a minimal valid vocabulary: the agent (defeasibly) infers the vocabulary in
(19a–c) (this covers all the variables the agent is aware of thanks to the dialogue strategy
from Section 3.2), and also defeasibly infers the minimal domain for Rt, defined in (19d).
Bt ={X : X ∈ B+ is a conjunct in δ0:t} (19a)
At ={X : X ∈ A+ is a conjunct in δ0:t} (19b)
Ot ={X : X ∈ O+ is a conjunct in δ0:t} (19c)
ΠtR ={X : X ∈ Π+R is a conjunct in δ0:t} (19d)
The evidence described in Section 3 yields three kinds of formulae in δ0:t that (par-
tially) describe R+: (5), (14), and X ∈ Π+R. The agent uses constraint solving to find,
or fail to find, a reward function Rt that satisfies all conjuncts in δ0:t of the form (5)
and (14), plus the constraint (20), which will ensure Rt is well-defined with respect to
its (estimated) domain (19d).
∀s1∀s2((s1  ΠtR ↔ s2  ΠtR)→ Rt(s1) = Rt(s2)) (20)
Constraints of the form (5) and (14) are skolemized and fed into an off-the-shelf
constraint solver (with R+ replaced with Rt). The possible denotations of these skolem
constants are the atomic states defined by the vocabulary (19a–c). If there is a solution,
the constraint solver returns for each skolem constant a specific denotation x ∈ v(Ct×At).
Substituting the skolem terms with their denotations projected onto ΠtR yields equal-
ities Rt(y) = r (from (5)) and inequalities Rt(y) > r (from (14)), where y ∈ v(ΠtR). A
complete function Rt is constructed from this partial function by defaulting to indiffer-
ence (recall Minimality): for any y ∈ v(ΠtR) where there is an inequality Rt(y) > r but
no equality Rt(y) = r, we set Rt(y) = r + c for some constant c (in our experiments,
c = 0.1); for any y ∈ v(ΠtR) for which there are no equalities or inequalities, we set
Rt(y) = 0.
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The constraint solver may yield no solution: i.e., there is no function Rt with the
currently estimated domain (19d) satisfying all observed evidence about states and their
rewards. This is the context “unforeseen rewards” described in Section 3.2 (see also
Figure 2): the agent asks (17), deferring dn update until it receives the expert’s answer.
The expert’s answer is guaranteed to provide a new variable to add to ΠtR. It may also
be a neologism—a variable the agent was unaware of—and so after updating δ0:t with
the expert’s answer, the agent backtracks to re-compute (19a–d).
4.2. Estimating 〈Πt, θt〉
Current approaches to incrementally learning Π in a graphical model of belief exploit
local inference to make the task tractable. There are essentially two forms of local
inference.
The first is a greedy local search over a full structure: remove an edge from the
current dag or add an edge that does not create a cycle, then test whether the result
has a higher likelihood given the evidence (e.g., Bramley et al. (2015); Friedman and
Goldszmidt (1997)). This is Conservative: Π changes only when evidence justifies it.
However, adapting it to our task is problematic. Firstly, such techniques rely heavily
on a decent initial dag to avoid getting stuck in a local maximum; but in our task the
agent’s initial unawareness of the possibilities makes an initial decent dag highly unlikely.
Secondly, removing an edge can break the global constraint on dns that all nodes connect
to the utility node. We would need to add a third option of doing local search given Π:
replace one edge in Π with another edge somewhere else. This additional option expands
the search space considerably.
We therefore adopt the alternative form of local inference: assume conditional inde-
pendence among parent sets. Buntine (1991) assumes that X’s parent set is conditionally
independent of Y ’s given evidence e0:t and the total temporal order  over the random
variables—X  Y means that X may be a parent to Y but not vice versa. This indepen-
dence assumption on its own is not sufficient for making reasoning tractable, however. If
a Bayes Net has 21 variables (as the ones we experiment with in Section 5 do), then a
variable may have 220 possible parent sets—a search space that is too large to be man-
ageable. So Buntine (1991) prunes X’s possible parent sets to those that evidence so
far makes reasonably likely (we will define “reasonably likely” in a precise way shortly).
There are then two alternative ways of updating:
• Parameter Update: Estimate the posterior probability of a parent set from
its prior probability and the latest evidence under an assumption that the set of
reasonable parent sets does not change.
• Structural Update: Review and potentially revise which parent sets are rea-
sonable, given a batch of evidence. (Thus, Structural Update changes the set of
possible structures which are considered).
We adapt Buntine’s model to our task in two ways. Firstly, Buntine’s model assumes
that the total ordering on variables is known. In our task the total order is hidden,
and marginalising over all possible temporal orders is not tractable—it is exponential
on the size of the vocabulary. We therefore make an even stronger initial independence
assumption than Buntine when deciding which parent sets are reasonable: Specifically,
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that X’s parent set is conditionally independent of Y ’s given evidence e0:t alone. Unfor-
tunately, this allows combinations of parent sets with non-zero probabilities to be cyclic.
We therefore have an additional step where we greedily search over the space of total
orderings (similar to (Friedman and Koller, 2003)), and use Integer Linear Programming
(Vanderbei, 2015) at each step to find a “most likely” causal structure Πt which both
obeys the currently proposed ordering and that is also a valid dn—in particular, it is a
dag where the utility node is a descendant of all other nodes.
Secondly, as the agent’s vocabulary of random variables expands, we need to provide
new probability distributions over the larger set of possible parent sets, which in turn
will get updated by subsequent evidence. We now describe each of these components of
the model in turn.
4.2.1. Parameter Update
Each variable V ∈ Ct is associated with a set Pv of reasonable parent sets. Each
parent set Πv ∈ Pv is some combination of variables from Ct ∪ At. Parameter Update
determines the posterior distribution over Pv given its prior distribution and the latest
piece of evidence under the assumption that the possible values of Pv do not change.
Updates from Domain Trials. Suppose that the latest evidence et is a domain trial (i.e.,
τt ∈ Sample0:t). Parameter Update uses Dirichlet distributions to support incremental
learning: if τt  V = i and τt  Πv = j, then we can calculate the posterior probability of
Πv in a single step using (21):
Pr(Πv|e0:t) = Pr(Πv|e0:t−1) (nv=i|j+αv=i|j−1)(nv=.|j+αv=.|j−1) (21)
Here, nv=i|j is the number of trials in Sample0:t where V = i and Πv = j, and αv=i|j
is a “pseudo-count” which represents the Dirichlet parameter for V = i and Πv = j.
The sum of all trials where Πv = j is given by nv=.|j . Formula (21) follows from the
recursive structure of the Γ function in the Dirichlet distribution (the Appendix provides
a derivation, which corrects an error in (Buntine, 1991)).
Estimating θt, given Πt, likewise exploits the Dirichlet distribution (Buntine, 1991,
p56):
Eθ|Sample0:t,Π(θv=i|j) =
∫
θ
θv=i|jPr(Sample|Π, θ)Pr(θ|Π)∫
θ
Pr(Sample|Π, θ)Pr(θ|Π)
=
nx=i|j + αv=i|j
nv=.|j + αv=.|j
(22)
In words, (22) computes the conditional probability tables (cpts) directly from the
counts in the trials and the appropriate Dirichlet parameters, which in turn quantify
the extent to which one should trust the counts in the domain trials for estimating
likelihoods—the higher the value of the αs relative to the ns, the less the counts influence
the probabilities. Note that the α-parameters vary across the values of the variables and
their (potential) parent sets. We motivate this shortly, when we describe how to perform
dn update when a new random variable needs to be added to it. At the start of the
learning process, αv=i|j = 0.5 for all V , i and j.
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Updates from Expert Evidence. Now suppose et is an expert utterance σt, but not one
that introduces a neologism (we discuss dn update over an expanded vocabulary at the
end of this section). Then Parameter Update starts by using ∧-elimination on δt (i.e.,
the partial description of dn+ that σt entails) to infer a conjunction pit,v of all conjuncts
in δ0:t of the form X ∈ Πv. Note that δt does not contain conjuncts of the form X 6∈ Πv
(see Section 3.2), although it may entail such formulae (e.g., from conjuncts declaring a
variable’s type). Formula (23) then computes a posterior distribution over Pv, where η
is a normalising factor:
Pr(Πv|e0:t) =
{
ηPr(Πv|e0:t−1) if Πv ` pit,v
0 otherwise
(23)
Equation (23) is Conservative—it preserves the relative likelihood of parent sets that
are consistent with pit,v. It offers a way to rapidly and incrementally update the proba-
bility distribution over Pv with at least some of the information that is revealed by the
latest expert evidence.
Enforcing global constraints on Π. Equations (21) and (23) on their own do not comply
with Satisfaction nor even with Consistency. If we naively construct the “most likely”
global structure by simply picking the highest probability parent set Πv for each vari-
able V independently, their combination might be cyclic, or violate information about
parenthood entailed by δ0:t.
To find a global structure which is valid as well as likely, we combine ILP techniques
with a greedy local search over the space of total orderings.
We first compute Pr(Pv|e0:t,) from Pr(Pv|e0:t), where  is a total temporal order
over dnt’s random variables that satisfies the partial order entailed by δ0:t. Next, we
use ILP techniques to determine the most likely structure Πm which obeys the current
ordering , and is a dag with all nodes connected to the utility node. We stop searching
when all valid total orders ′ formed via a local change to  yield a less likely structure
(i.e., Pr(Πm′ |e0:t,′) ≤ Pr(Πm |e0:t,)), and return Πm as Πt. We now describe these
steps in detail.
The partial description δ0:t imposes a partial order on the random variables, thanks
to the expert’s declarations of the form X ∈ ΠY (this corresponds to condition (i) in
Fact 1), its entailments about each variable’s type (i.e., At, Bt or Ot), which are in effect
constraints on the relative position of variables within the dag (conditions (ii)–(iv) in
Fact 1); and information about whether a variable is an immediate parent to the utility
node (condition (v)):
Fact 1. Total orders that satisfy δ0:t
A total order  of random variables satisfies the partial order entailed by δ0:t iff it
satisfies the following 5 conditions:
(i) If δ0:t |= X ∈ Πy, then X  Y ;
(ii) If δ0:t |= A ∈ A+ then X 6 A for any X, and A 6 Y for any Y where δ0:t |= Y ∈
Bt;
(iii) If δ0:t |= O ∈ O+ then there is a variable X where δ0:t |= X ∈ A+ and X  O;
(iv) If δ0:t |= B ∈ B+ ∧O ∈ O+ then B  O; and
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(v) for any X,Y , if δ0:t |= X ∈ Π+R and δ0:t 6|= Y ∈ Π+R, then Y  X.
Note that thanks to dn0 and the dialogue strategies, where Φ is B+, O+, A+, Π+R or Πy,
one can test whether δ0:t |= X ∈ Φ via ∧-elimination.
The agent starts by choosing (at random) a total order  that satisfies Fact 1.
The agent then uses (24) to estimate the probabilities over direct parenthood relations
(pa(X,Y ) means X is a parent to Y ) given the evidence and :
Pr(pa(X,Y )|e0:t,) =
{ ∑
Πy∈Py :X∈Πy Pr(Πy|e0:t) if X  Y
0 if Y  X (24)
Thanks to Fact 1 this makes any combination of non-zero probability parenthood rela-
tions a dag with no B-variable being a descendant to an A variable, and all A variables
have no parents. But it does not guarantee that all nodes are connected to the utility
node. We use an ILP step to impose this global constraint. The result is a valid structure
Π (i.e., it satisfies δ0:t) that evidence so far also deems to be likely (we give an outline
proof of its validity on page 25).
The ILP Step is formally defined as follows:
Decision variables: Where X,Y ∈ Ct ∪ At, pa(X,Y ) is a Boolean variable with value
1 if X is a parent of Y (i.e., X ∈ Πy), and 0 otherwise
Objective Function: We want to find the most likely combination of valid parenthood
relations: i.e., we want to solve (25):
max
∑
X,Y ∈Ct∪At
Pr(pa(X,Y ))∗pa(X,Y )+(1−Pr(pa(X,Y )))∗(1−pa(X,Y )) (25)
Constraints: C1 ensures three things: (i) variables cannot have a parent which is not
present in at least one of the reasonable parent sets (see (24)); (ii) parent sets obey
all expert declarations of the form Z ∈ Πz′ (by equation (23)); and (iii) parents
obey the currently proposed temporal ordering  (by equation (24)) thereby guar-
anteeing that the final graph is acyclic with no B variable being a descendant of A
and all A variables are orphans. Constraints C2 and C3 ensure that the final graph
satisfies the necessary global conditions for being a dn, namely that every variable
is in some way connected to the utility node, and that every outcome variable has
at least one action ancestor. C4 ensures that the decision variables take on binary
values (0 or 1).
C1 : ∀X,Y.(Pr(pa(X,Y )) = 0 =⇒ pa(X,Y ) = 0) Disallow impossible parents
C2 : ∀X /∈ ΠtR.(
∑
y pa(X,Y ) ≥ 1) One child minimum
C3 : ∀O ∈ O.(∑y∈O∪A pa(Y,O) ≥ 1) No orphaned outcomes
C4 : ∀X,Y.pa(X,Y ) ∈ {0, 1} Binary Restriction
Linear Relaxation of the ILP Step. Finding the solution to a Linear Program where
all decision variables must be integers is an NP-hard problem. So we approximate the
solution via Linear Relaxation: we replace C4 with (26), so that the values of decision
variables can be real numbers:
∀X,Y.pa(X,Y ) ∈ [0, 1] (26)
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We then round the resulting values to integers. This reduces the time needed to compute
a solution, but one must be careful in the rounding procedure: simply rounding each
pa∗(X,Y ) to its nearest integer may create an inconsistent dn. Rounding in two phases
avoids this. In the first phase, we produce a set of rounded decision variables pa′(X,Y )
that satisfy C1 and C2:
pa′(X,Y ) =
{
1 if pa∗(X,Y ) ≥ 0.5 ∨ (X /∈ ΠtR ∧ ∀Z 6= Y.(pa∗(X,Y ) ≥ pa∗(X,Z)))
0 otherwise
In the second phase, we ensure that constraint C3 is also satisfied, producing the final
integer values for all the variables pa(X,Y ):
pa(X,Y ) = 1 iff pa′(X,Y ) = 1 ∨
(Y ∈ O∧
∀Z((Z 6= X ∧ Z ∈ O ∪A)→
(pa′(Z, Y ) = 0 ∧ Pr(pa(X,Y )) > Pr(pa(Z, Y )))))
Because the random variable Pv does not contain all possible parent sets to V (so
as to keep learning tractable), it is possible that there is in fact no solution to the ILP
step for any valid temporal order . This is a context in which the agent performs a
Structural Update, which in turn changes the variables that satisfy the antecedent to
constraint C1.
4.2.2. Structural Update
To make learning tractable, Pv includes only reasonable parent sets to V—a strict
subset of those that are possible. But as evidence changes, so does what is reasonably
likely. Therefore, the agent occasionally performs a Structural Update: the full batch of
evidence e0:t is used to review and potentially revise the possible values of Pv and its
probability distribution.
Figure 3 depicts the structure of the algorithm that corresponds roughly to the nodes
“estimate Πt” and “estimate θt” in Figure 2. In particular, it depicts the four contexts
in which Structural Update is performed in our experiments in Section 5:
1. There have been 100 domain trials since last structural update
2. The agent has just discovered an unforeseen factor
3. The latest dialogue evidence σt yields a 0 probability to all parent sets in Pv via
equation (23)
4. The algorithm for enforcing global constraints on Π fails to produce any valid
structure
The input to Structural Update consists of a (chance) variable V , the batch of ev-
idence e0:t, the prior distribution Prt−n(Πv) over all possible parent sets to V (where
t− n is the time of the previous structural update), and the current partial description
δ0:t of the dn. Its output is a (perhaps new) set of values for Pv (i.e., those parent sets
to V that are currently deemed “reasonable”), the posterior probability Prt(Πv) for each
possible parent set Πv (whether it is in Pv or not) and the posterior probability distri-
bution Prt(Pv) (which is computed by normalising Prt(Πv) for Πv ∈ Pv). Informally,
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Figure 3: Algorithm for Estimating 〈Πt, θt〉.
the Structural Update algorithm dynamically constructs a parent lattice Ltv, with each
node corresponding to a parent set to V and arcs corresponding to the superset relation.
When expanding the lattice by adding a new node, we estimate its posterior probability
given the evidence e0:t. We stop expanding the lattice when all its leaves have a posterior
probability that is below a certain threshold. Thus Minimality is implicit: Structural
Update assumes that supersets of sufficiently improbable parent sets will not improve
their probability.
More formally, the root(s) of the parent lattice Ltv are the minimal valid parent sets:
i.e., they contain X if δ0:t |= X ∈ Πv, and if δ0:t |= V ∈ Ot then Ltv’s root(s) each contain
at least one variable from At ∪ Ot. For each root Πv, one computes its posterior proba-
bility, given the evidence e0:t. If a node was alive in the previous Structural Update, then
this posterior probability is already calculated via the sequence of Parameter Updates
that were performed between the previous and current structural updates. It is therefore
immediately available. If the node was marked as asleep in the previous lattice, however,
then the node’s posterior probability will not have been updated with the intervening
domain trials—it is computed now by performing a sequence of Parameter Updates (see
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equation (21)).
The highest of these posterior probabilities is taken to be the Best-Posterior. One
then marks the nodes as alive if its posterior probability is ≥ C ∗Best-Posterior for some
constant C (in the experiments in Section 5, C = 0.001), and asleep otherwise. You then
create a new node in the lattice by adding a variable to an alive leaf node. You compute
its posterior probability, and if it exceeds the current Best-Posterior, then you update
Best-Posterior and re-classify which nodes in the lattice are alive and which are asleep
accordingly. You stop when all the leaves in the current lattice are asleep.
The set Pv is defined to be all the alive parent sets in L
t
v and their ancestors in L
t
v.
5
Having (re-)estimated Pv for each variable V , you test whether each variable X 6∈ ΠtR is
in at least one reasonable parent set: if it is not then there is clearly no valid Π that one
can generate from them (since X will not connect to the utility node). This test failing
is the context “Unknown Effects” in the agent’s dialogue strategy, which we described in
Section 3.2.2: i.e., instead of expanding the search space by reducing the asleep threshold
C, the agent seeks further evidence by asking the expert (18): what is an effect of X?
The evidence e0:t and partial description δ0:t get updated with the expert’s answer, and
dn update begins again—backtracking to estimating the random variables via (19a–c)
may be necessary because the expert’s answer may be a neologism. The experiments in
Section 5 show that this querying strategy keeps a tight reign on the size of the search
space, while still ensuring that many of the dependencies in Πt are inferred defeasibly
from the domain trials, rather than monotonically from explicit expert declarations about
parenthood.
The posterior probabilities that are computed during the lattice expansion are as-
sumed to be the posterior probabilities Prt(Πv|Ltv)—the probability that Πv is Π+v ,
given that Π+v ∈ Ltv (if Πv 6∈ Ltv, then Prt(Πv|Ltv) = 0). The posterior probabilities
on every possible parent structure is then defined by (27) to (29), where Pr(Ltv) is the
probability that the true parent set Π+v is in L
t
v, and p is the probability mass we wish
to assign to the unexplored space:
Prt(Πv) = Prt(L
t
v)Prt(Πv|Ltv) + Prt(¬Ltv)Prt(Πv|¬Ltv) (27)
Prt(Πv|¬Ltv) =
 0 if Πv ∈ L
t
v
1
2|Ct∪At\V | − |Ltv|
if Πv 6∈ Ltv (28)
Prt(¬Lv) = p
Prt(Lv) = 1− Prt(¬Lv) (29)
Thus Structural Update returns for each chance variable V the values Pv, Prt(Pv) and
Prt(Πv) for all possible parent sets Πv. But the algorithm does not require the agent
5This contrasts with Buntine’s Structural Update, in which Pv is the alive parent sets only. We
include asleep subsets of alive parent sets because our version of Parameter Update abstracts over all
possible total temporal orders of the variables. To illustrate the issue, suppose that there is a very strong
statistical correlation in the domain trials between X and Y—so strong that the only alive parent set
for Px is {Y }, and the only alive parent set for Py is {X}. If Px = {{Y }} and Py = {{X}}, then these
generate no consistent structure. But if Pv includes all subsets of alive parent sets, then we avoid this
problem: ∅ will be a possible value of Px and of Py , even though Parameter Update deems ∅ to be an
unlikely parent set for X and for Y .
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to enumerate or reason about parent sets within the unexplored space. These become
relevant only if in the next Structural Update, the agent expands the parent lattice to
include a parent set that was absent from the prior lattice.
The process for estimating Πt concludes, as always, by applying the algorithm for
enforcing global constraints that we described earlier (see Figure 3). If this succeeds, it
returns Πt, and from this one computes θt via (22). If not, then the agent reduces the
asleep threshold (by multiplying C by 0.1) and attempts Structural Update again.
4.2.3. Initial Distribution
We implicitly encode the defeasible principle of Minimality in our initial distribution
over parent sets by making larger parent sets less likely than smaller ones. The agent
starts with a small probability ρ that Y is a parent to X (provided this is consistent with
the variables’ types as stipulated in δ0). The probability of a parent set Πx is then the
product of each individual parent’s presence or absence:
Pr0(pa(Y,X)) ∝
{
0 if δ0 |= ¬pa(Y,X)
ρ otherwise
(30)
Pr(Πx) =
∏
Y ∈ΠX
Pr(pa(Y,X))
∏
Z 6∈ΠX
(1− Pr(pa(Z,X))) (31)
For each X ∈ C0, the agent uses (30), (31) and Structural Update to dynamically con-
struct the set P 0x of reasonable parent sets of X and its initial probability distribution.
4.2.4. Updating with Evidence containing a Neologism
Suppose the latest evidence et is an expert utterance σt that features a neologism
Z. Then by (19a–c), Z is a random variable in dnt but it was not a part of dnt−1.
This means that the prior distributions over the possible parent sets no longer cover all
possible parent sets! These must be updated to take account of the extra possibilities
afforded by the addition of Z, and to ensure that the definitions we have given so far
for calculating posterior distributions from evidence (e.g., equation (21)) remain well-
defined. In addition, the agent cannot observe Z’s past values in Sample0:t—i.e., it
cannot observe nz=i|j , nor nv=i|j when Z ∈ Πv. However, we need these counts for
Parameter Update (see (21)) and estimating θt (see (22)). The Dirichlet α-parameters
in (21) and (22) that involve Z are also not defined. We now describe how the agent
revises all these parameters, so as to ensure that (21) and (22) remain well defined and
continue to support probabilistic reasoning over the newly expanded hypothesis space.
We start by defining how the agent computes the probability distribution over the
expanded set of possible parent sets. The agent starts this process by performing a
Structural Update on the batch of evidence e0:t−1 that preceded the latest evidence et
with the neologism Z. This ensures that the (small) probability mass p that is assigned
to the set of “unreasonable” parent sets takes into account all evidence to date. This
yields a revised (prior) probability distribution Pr(Πx|e0:t−1) for every possible parent
set Πx of X ∈ Ct that does not include the new variable Z. Equation (32) then assigns
probabilities to all possible parent sets to X 6= Z, including parent sets containing Z:
Pr(Πx|e0:t) ∝
 0 if δ0:t |= ¬Πx(1− ρ)Pr(Πx|e0:t−1) if Z 6∈ Πx
ρPr(Π′x|e0:t−1) if Πx = Π′x ∪ {Z}
(32)
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This update is Conservative, because it preserves the relative likelihood among the
parent sets that do not include Z—in particular, unreasonable parent sets remain un-
reasonable. It is also Minimal because it re-assigns only a small proportion ρ of the
probability mass of a parent set that does not include Z to the parent set formed by
adding Z to it—in particular, adding Z to an unreasonable parent set is unreasonable.
As usual, the agent needn’t actively enumerate each possible parent set nor compute its
probability; rather (32) is used to dynamically construct the lattice Ltx, from which the
agent identifies the reasonable parent sets P tx for X and P
t
x’s probability distribution,
where the possibilities now include the additional variable Z.
If Z is a chance variable, then equation (33) in combination with (31) defines Pr(Πz|e0:t)
(if Z is an action variable, then ΠZ = ∅):
Pr(pa(Y,Z)|e0:t) =
 1 if δ0:t |= pa(Y, Z)0 if δ0:t |= ¬pa(Y,Z)
ρ otherwise
(33)
This is Minimal because any variable being a parent to Z is assigned a low default
probability ρ; so the dynamic lattice construction Ltz for identifying P
t
z and its probability
distribution will restrict search considerably. With Pv and its distribution for all V ∈ Ct
in place, one applies the algorithm for enforcing global constraints to yield Πt.
We now return to the issue of the counts nv=i|j , and the Dirichlet α-parameters.
Our model avoids the computational complexity of marginalising over Z’s past values by
throwing away the past domain trials Sample0:t−1 and their counts nv=i|j , but retaining
the relative likelihoods they gave rise to by packing these into updated values for the
Dirichlet α-parameters, as shown in (34) (where K is a constant):
Where Z ∈ dnt but Z 6∈ dnt−1
nv=i|j = 0 for all v, Πv
αv=i|j =
{
K ∗ Prt−1(V = i,Πv = j) if V 6= Z and Z 6∈ Πv
K ∗ 0.5 if V = Z or Z ∈ Πv
(34)
With the α-parameters and the counts nv=i|j now defined over the expanded set of atomic
states, the agent can compute θt, given Πt and e0:t, using (22). Furthermore, it ensures
that the equations (21) and (22) remain well-defined, should the dn get updated by
subsequent observed evidence.
Equation (34) makes the agent Conservative because when it observes subsequent
evidence, the revised α-parameters ensure that the likelihoods inferred from the past
domain trials bias the estimated likelihoods of Π and of θ that are based on that subse-
quent evidence (via equations (21) and (22) respectively). Indeed, the larger K is, the
more Conservative you are: i.e., the more the probability distribution over dependen-
cies and cpts before your set of random variables changed influences reasoning about
dependencies and cpts after the set of random variables changes.
4.2.5. DN Update is Valid
We have now defined how to use evidence to update each of the dn’s components. It
meets the desiderata from Section 2. In particular:
Fact 2. dn update complies with Consistency and Satisfaction: i.e., dnt is a consistent
dn, and dnt |= δ0:t.
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Outline proof. δ0:t contains three kinds of conjuncts: (i) X ∈ B+, X ∈ A+, X ∈ O+,
X ∈ Π+R; (ii) formulae of the form (5) and (14); and (iii) X ∈ Πy. Equations (19) together
with the algorithm for enforcing global constraints guarantees that Πt satisfies all the
conjuncts of type (i), including their consequences on each variable’s relative position
in the causal structure Π+. This is because Πt satisfies a total order  (see equation
(24) and C1 in the ILP step), where by Fact 1  satisfies the partial order imposed by
δ0:t—e.g., where δ0:t |= X ∈ B+, Πtx ⊂ Bt. Rt is a consistent preference function because:
(a) equation (20) makes Rt well-defined on its domain ΠtR; and (b) since its range is R it
defines an asymmetric and transitive relation. Further, since all conjuncts in δ0:t of form
(ii) are constraints on R+, it follows immediately that the constraint solver returns a
reward function Rt that satisfies these. Equation (23) plus C1 in the ILP step guarantees
that Πt entails conjuncts of type (iii). Furthermore, the algorithm for enforcing global
constraints guarantees Πt is a dag with all nodes connected to the utility node: it is a
dag because Πt satisfies a consistent total order ; and all nodes are connected to the
utility node because of constraints C2 and C3 in the ILP Step. Finally, equation (22)
guarantees that θt is a consistent probability distribution. Thus dnt is consistent, and
dnt |= δ0:t. 
5. Experiments
Our experiments show that our agent can learn the optimal policy for a given task,
even when initially unaware of factors that are critical to its success. Further, we show
the usefulness of the defeasible principles our agent adheres to (such as Minimality and
Conservativity) by comparing our agent with several variations which abandon those
principles.
We evaluate our agent against two different scenarios. In the first scenario, we have
the agent learn in 10 randomly generated decision problems. By varying the true decision
problem the agent must learn, these experiments evaluate whether the model’s ability
to converge on optimal behaviour is robust to the type of domain it has to learn about.
In the second scenario, we have the agent learn the hand-crafted “Barley” example from
the introduction (see Figure 1). This experiment allows us to show how the model
performs on a concrete example of our novel task which is explicitly designed to require
the exploitation of unforeseen possibilities to be successful.
Our primary metric is policy error (PE). Equation (35) defines PEt at time t as the
weighted average of the expected difference in reward between the true optimal policy
pi∗+ and the agent’s perceived optimal policy pi
∗
t (observations b are projected onto the
agent’s current conceptualisation of the domain to ensure pi∗t is defined):
PEt =
∑
b∈v(B+)
Pr+(b)
[
EU+(pi
∗
+(b)|b)− EU+(pi∗t (b  Bt)|b)
]
(35)
We also measure the agent’s cumulative reward over the learning period:
Rt =
∑
τi∈Sample0:t
ri (36)
Additionally, we measure the runtime the agent takes to reason with the 3000 train-
ing samples. We do not measure the agent’s performance in terms of, for instance, the
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minimum edit distance between dnt and dn+, because the mapping from an optimal pol-
icy to its dn is one to many—for us, constructing a dn is merely the means for achieving
optimal behaviour, and structural differences between dn+ and dnt may be benign in
this respect.
All experiments are run over 3000 training examples. However, we assume that each
time the expert sends a message, the agent misses out on an opportunity to interact with
the domain. This means that the more the expert intervenes, the fewer domain trials
the agent gets rewards from.
5.1. Random dns: Setup
In these experiments, we tested each agent variation against 10 different decision
problems. Each true decision network dn+ consists of 21 Boolean variables: 7 action
variables; 7 “before” variables; and 7 “outcome” variables (i.e., |A+| = |B+| = |O+| = 7).
This results in non-trivial decision problems with over 2 million atomic states. We
generate both the structure and parameters for each dn+ randomly using an adapted
version of the Bayesian network generation algorithm in (Ide et al., 2004).6 We also
create a reward domain for each dn+ by choosing 5 chance variables at random, then
generate a reward function which yields rewards in the range 0–50.
We then assign an agent an initial conceptualisation dn0 of the decision problem; we
test how unawareness affects learning by varying dn0. To evaluate an agent’s performance
in learning, we run 100 simulations, each consisting of the agent observing and learning
from 3000 pieces of evidence (a mix of domain trials and expert messages). Running
100 simulations allows us to smooth over the fact that learning may be affected by the
non-deterministic outcomes of the actions it performs. Our performance metrics then
take the average over the 100 simulations.
We evaluate and compare agents that vary along the following dimensions:
Initial Awareness: We compare an agent which starts at dn0 with full knowledge of
the (true) decision problem’s set of random variables against one which starts with
just one action and outcome variable:
Vocab Size at dn0
Min-Vocab 2
Full-Vocab 21
Expert Tolerance: We vary the expert’s tolerance to the agent’s suboptimal behaviour
when she deliberates over whether to offer unsolicited advice: this is achieved by
varying β and γ in (8):
β γ
Low-Tolerance 0.001 1
Default-Tolerance 0.9 50
6Our adaptation adds additional rules to ensure the algorithm generates only valid dns. For example,
the structure must conform to the rules of each variable’s type.
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Minimality: An agent can be minimal, slightly minimal, or maximal. They vary on
the following three dimensions: (i) adopting a greedy search for a minimal domain
of R (see equation (19d)) vs. defining the domain of Rt to be all of Ct (i.e., the
maximum possible domain, creating many more arrows in the graphical component
of the dn); (ii) the prior probability ρ that is assigned to the parenthood relations
(see equations (30) and (32)) can make parenthood (defeasibly) unlikely (ρ = 0.1)
or equally likely as unlikely (ρ = 0.5); and (c) the asleep threshold C that prunes
the search space to reasonable parent sets can result in pruning (C = 0.001) or not
(C = 0).
Minimal ΠtR? ρ C
Minimal yes 0.1 0.001
Slightly-minimal yes 0.5 0.001
Maximal no 0.5 0
Conservativity: An agent can be conservative or non-conservative. They vary on how
they calculate the probability distribution over the expanded set of possible options
when a new variable gets added to the dn.
All agents set nv=i|j to 0 when it discovers a new variable. But the conservative
and non-conservative agents vary on the how they re-set the probability distribution
over dependencies and the Dirichlet α-parameters:
Estimating Pr(Πtv) and Pr(θt)
when adding a new variable
Conservative Use (32), (33), and (34) with K = 20
Non-Con Use (30) and αn=i|j = α0 = 0.5
Domain Strategy: The agent’s domain-level strategy is to execute an optimal action
vs. some other action in a ratio of (1− ) : , and initially  = 0.3 (see Section 3.1).
We vary how this strategy changes during learning as follows: (i)  does not change
(Static); or (ii)  gets progressively reduced (Decay).
Initial  Decay factor
(per time step)
Static 0.3 1.0
Decay 0.3 0.999
Unless stated otherwise, the agents we evaluate are Min-Vocab, Minimal, Conservative
and Static, and the expert has Default Tolerance.
The baseline agent for our task adopts a standard -greedy strategy (with  set to
0.3) to learn an optimal policy from dn0: it ignores observed evidence that makes dn0
invalid. So whatever the observed evidence, the baseline agent’s random variables C0∪A0
and dependencies Π0 do not change. All our other agents learn valid dns (see Fact 2).
We compare the performance of the following nine agents on our task: the Baseline agent,
Default (i.e., min-vocab, minimal, conservative, static, default tolerance), Low-Tolerance
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PEt p-value
Default 0.34 -
Baseline 1.85 0.00
Low-Tol 0.51 0.01
Slightly-Min 0.49 0.01
Decay 0.47 0.03
Full-Vocab 0.08 0.00
Non-Con 0.78 0.00
Maximal 1.21 0.00
(a) dnbest+
PEt p-value
Default 0.97 -
Baseline 3.05 0.00
Low-Tol 1.10 0.20
Slightly Min 1.08 0.24
Decay 0.86 0.20
Full-Vocab 0.03 0.00
Non-Con 1.44 0.00
Maximal 1.30 0.00
(b) dnworst+
Table 1: Policy error (PE) for agents at t=3000. Average of 100 runs reported.
(expert has low tolerance); Slightly-Min (agent is slightly minimal), Maximal (agent is
maximal), Non-Con (agent is non-conservative), Decay (agent explores progressively less
during learning), and Full-Vocab (the agent starts out aware of dn+’s vocabulary, but
not its dependencies or reward function).
In some of the 100 simulations, an agent that lacks the computational advantages
of Minimality—a principle we argued would enhance tractability—crashes before it is
observed and learned from 3000 pieces of evidence.7 In that case, the agent’s dn just
before the crash occurred is used to compute the performance metric for that simulation.
5.2. Random dns: Results
Across a variety of randomly generated dns, each with different dependencies, cpts,
and reward domains, our agent converges to a near-optimal policy with a relatively small
amount of data (3000 pieces of evidence). Tables 1 and 2 show the performance metrics
for each agent in terms of final policy error (PE) and accumulated reward, respectively.
Figure 4 also shows the rewards gained from the domain trials during learning (averaged
across blocks of 150 domain trials and 100 simulations). We report numbers for the dn
dnbest+ where the agent was most successful at achieving a low PE, and for dn
worst
+ where
the agent was least successful, so as to give a measure of the lower and upper bounds of
the agent’s performance. (Full details on dnbest+ and dn
worst
+ are in the Appendix.) The
p-values compare each agent variation to the Default agent, and measure the probability
of seeing a result of this magnitude (or greater) given the null hypothesis that the true
average of both learning agents is identical.
From these results we see that the Default agent significantly outperforms the Baseline
agent, both in terms of final PE and total accumulated reward. Its PE is also significantly
lower than the Maximal and Non-Conservative agents.
We now discuss the various factors that affect learning.
7We define a crash as an “Out of Memory” error on a Java Virtual Machine with a 4GB Memory
Allocation Pool, or a simulation taking longer than its maximum allocated time of 12 hours.
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Reward p-value
Default 70043 -
Baseline 69541 0.01
Low-Tol 48726 0.00
Slightly-Min 62145 0.00
Decay 70940 0.00
Full-Vocab 72701 0.00
Non-Con 70079 0.85
Maximal 36760 0.00
(a) dnbest+
Reward p-value
Default 79894 -
Baseline 79211 0.00
Low-Tol 53568 0.00
Slightly-Min 79711 0.32
Decay 81518 0.00
Full-Vocab 84342 0.00
Non-Con 79397 0.00
Maximal 77158 0.00
(b) dnworst+
Table 2: Accumulated reward for agents at t=3000. Average of 100 runs reported
Initial awareness. As expected, starting with complete knowledge of the vocabulary is
an advantage. Tables 1 and 2 show that the Full-Vocab agent achieves the lowest PE and
highest cumulative rewards across all simulations. This is unsurprising: the agent never
has to “throw away” counts from the trials, and it deliberates over all actions from the
start. However, the Full-Vocab agent takes significantly longer to run than the Default
agent, often anywhere from 3 to 8 times as long (see Table 3). There are two reasons
for this. First, inference over a dn with more variables is usually more expensive—
the Full-Vocab agent infers a 21 variable dn from the start, while the Default agent
initially updates a dn with a much smaller vocabulary. Second, starting with a large
initial vocabulary and a fairly weak prior makes it more difficult for Structural Update
to prune the search space of parent sets. There is often an initial explosion in the
number of parent sets that the Full-Vocab agent considers reasonable, because it has not
yet gathered enough information from the domain trials to discriminate unreasonable
parent sets from reasonable ones. In contrast, when the agent starts out aware of fewer
variables, each new variable is incrementally introduced into a context where the agent
has observed enough evidence to construct a more aggressive prior via equation (32).
Time (s) p-value
Default 3081 -
Baseline 13 0.00
Low-Tol 8196 0.00
Slightly-Min 12264 0.00
Decay 2923 0.30
Full-Vocab 12628 0.00
Non-Con 2174 0.00
(a) dnbest+ .
Time (s) p-value
Default 1266 -
Baseline 15 0.00
Low-Tol 2162 0.00
Slightly-Min 4979 0.00
Decay 1198 0.31
Full-Vocab 9465 0.00
Non-Con 1134 0.02
(b) dnworst+
Table 3: Run time in seconds for agents at t=3000. Average over 100 runs reported. (“Maximal” agent
omitted, as none of the agent’s runs managed to finish)
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Expert tolerance. In comparison to the Default expert, the Low-Tolerance expert results
in a marginally worse PE, and significantly worse total accumulated reward. This is
partly because each time the agent receives a message from the expert, it misses both
an opportunity to receive a reward by taking an action in the domain, and also an
opportunity to improve its estimate of Π and θ by observing an additional domain trial.
In our experiments, the Low Tolerance expert can end up sending as many as 15 times
more messages than the Default. One advantage of the Low-Tolerance expert, however,
is that the agent makes early improvements to its policy. This is illustrated by Figure 5,
which shows the PEs over time.
Minimality. The results show that at least some level of minimality is necessary. In the
vast majority of simulations (70%–100%, depending on dn+), the Maximal agent runs
out of either time or memory, and so fails to collect rewards or improve its policy via the
3000 pieces of evidence. By comparison, the Default agent does not crash in any of the
simulations.
Without a mechanism to prune the set of parent sets or the domain of the reward
function, the agent must consider an exponential number of options. For more than
a small number of variables, this quickly becomes intractable. The differences are less
dramatic for the Slightly-Minimal agent: fewer simulations crash, and those that do tend
to crash come later in the simulation. However, its PE is still significantly worse than
the Default agent’s PE. Excluding crashed agents from the results yields no significant
difference in PE, suggesting that even with infinite time and resources, there is not
necessarily any harm to adopting Minimality. The largest difference is in the run times:
the Slightly Minimal Agent takes around 4 times as long to run as the Default agent.
Thus, Minimality makes the problem tractable without harming performance.
Conservativity. The Non-Conservative agent has a significantly worse PE than the De-
fault agent. There appear to be two benefits to preserving information about which
parent sets are unreasonable when a neologism is introduced. First, it directs the agent
towards more accurate representations of the dependencies within the dn, and therefore
hopefully allows it to make better decisions with equivalent samples. Second, having a
more aggressive prior leads the (Conservative) Default agent to learn more vocabulary—
on average 19 versus 17—as it is more likely to encounter a context where it asks the
expert question (18) (“What is affected by X?”). This also explains why the Non-
Conservative agent is marginally faster than the Default agent—it reasons with a smaller
vocabulary.
Domain Strategy. The Decay agent gathered a significantly larger total reward than the
Default agent, without a significant difference in their PEs. In other words, gradually
reducing the extent to which the agent explores the space as it gathers more evidence
helps it to converge faster on a decent policy. But we haven’t demonstrated here whether
the Decay agent would maintain this advantage as one increases the number of variables
of dn+: it may be a disadvantage to gradually explore less if the agent is more radically
unaware at the start of the learning process than we used in our experiments here.
Additionally, while it was not within the scope of these experiments to explore the
space of exploration versus exploitation strategies (we arbitrarily chose an initial split of
0.7:0.3), it is possible that superior initial parameters (and decay rates) exist for learning
the optimal policy.
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Figure 4: Rewards on dnbest+ . Results averaged across 100 simulations, and blocks of 150 time steps.
Note the scales in the two graphs differ, to help depict the performance of all agent types—the dips in
the second figure are due to the agents crashing before t=3000.
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Figure 5: Policy error at each time step on dnbest+ (averaged across 100 simulations).
5.3. Barley dn: Setup
In these experiments, we test our default agent’s performance on the hand-crafted
barley example (see Figure 1) and compare it against the baseline agent (which ignores
evidence that makes dn0 invalid). The Barley dn is intended to reflect a somewhat
realistic domain for our novel task, and has been explicitly designed so that learning the
optimal policy requires knowledge of factors that the agent is initially unaware of.
As in the previous experiment, we run 100 simulations over 3000 pieces of evidence
then average the results. The structure of the agent’s initial decision network dn0 and
the true decision network dn+ are shown in Figure 1. The cpts for each node are in the
Appendix.
5.4. Barley dn: Results
Figure 7 shows the policy error and average reward over 3000 pieces of evidence for
the Barley dn. As expected, the baseline quickly stops improving as it reaches the bounds
of what is achievable given its limited level of awareness. On the other hand, the default
agent continues to improve its policy as it discovers unforeseen concepts and actions, and
eventually converges upon a near-optimal policy.
In addition to learning a near-optimal policy, the agent also learns a fairly accurate
and efficient representation of the underlying decision network for the task. Figure 6
shows an example of the agent’s learned graph at t=3000. Notice that, in this run, the
agent did not manage to discover two pieces of the true vocabulary—namely Weeds and
Infestation. Both of these are outcome variables which are not in the reward domain.
In future work, we aim to explore methods to allow the agent discover these variables
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Figure 6: Difference in structure between the true dn and one learned by default agent at t=3000 for a
(randomly chosen) simulation
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Figure 7: Reward and policy error for agents on the Barley task
which provide a more efficient factorization of the problem if discovered, but which are
not necessarily vital for learning the optimal policy.
Despite missing these two variables, the agent attempts to make reasonable com-
pensations for their absence. For example, in the absence of the Infestation variable,
the agent assumes that Insect-Prevalence is directly connected to Y ield. The few other
incorrect edges are either due to reversals of causality (for instance, the model assumes
Protein influences Nitrogen instead of vice versa) or by the model’s bias towards simplic-
ity in the absence of sufficient domain trials (for example, Precipitation has a relatively
weak influence on Nitrogen compared to its many other parents, so the agent instead
spuriously connects Precipitation to Local-Concern—a variable with no parents).
6. Related Work
The literature on learning optimal policies includes methods for dealing with nu-
merous types of change, such as non-stationary rewards (Besbes et al., 2014), or noise
in sensing and actuation (da Silva et al., 2006). Such methods have also been applied
in situations involving hidden variables (e.g., with Partially Observed Markov Decision
Processes (Leonetti et al., 2011)), or in cases where the learner must reason about the
underlying probabilistic structure of the problem (e.g, with Factored Markov Decision
Processes (Degris et al., 2006)). However, these methods require all possible states and
actions to be known in advance of learning. That is, the agent starts out with complete
knowledge of C and A. In contrast, our agent learns these components from evidence.
There are a few notable exceptions in the reinforcement learning (rl) literature, which
attempt to relax the standard assumption that all possible states and actions are known
in advance of learning. Rong (2016) defines Markov Decision Processes with Unawareness
(mdpus), and also provides algorithms for learning optimal policies, even when the agent
starts out unaware of actions and states that influence what is optimal. This work
allows an agent to discover an unforeseen atomic state or unforeseen action via a random
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exploration function that is a part of the mdpu. Our work contrasts with this in several
ways. First, we support discovering unforeseen possibilities from evidence that stems
from communication with an expert, not just via exploration. Secondly, and in light
of this quite different kind of evidence, the agent is not simply discovering at most one
new atomic state from the latest piece of evidence, but rather discovering an unforeseen
concept, which instantly extends the set of atomic states considerably: e.g., an unforeseen
concept corresponding to a Boolean random variable doubles the set of atomic states.
Accordingly, and in contrast to mdpus, the set of atomic states in our task is not defined
by a single random variable whose set of possible values change as the agent becomes
more aware. Rather, the domain states are conceptualised via a set of random variables
in a dependency structure, and the agent must learn that dependency structure so that
computing joint probability distributions in the domain remains tractable. Learning
the concepts and their dependencies is challenging but ultimately worth it, because the
probabilistic conditional independence they encapsulate makes learning and reasoning
(whether exact or approximate) more tractable. This enables us to conduct experiments
in Section 5 where the (true) decision problem consists of 2 million distinct atomic states,
compared with the few thousand distinct atomic states in the discretised models that are
used in Rong’s experiments.
Selective perception methods, such as McCallum’s (McCallum and Ballard, 1996) U-
tree algorithm, were designed for problems in which the true state space may technically
be available, but is infeasibly large to reason with. The U-tree method initially treats
all states as indistinguishable, then recursively splits states in two as the agent discovers
significant differences in their expected reward. The agent thus learns an increasingly
complex representation of the state space. The U-tree algorithm handles sequential plan-
ning while our model (currently) supports only single-stage decision problems; however,
there are three main learning tasks that our model supports that the U-tree algorithm
does not. First, our model accommodates situations where the agent is made aware of
an entirely new possible action, while the U-Tree algorithm assumes that the set of ac-
tions remains fixed. Secondly, our model learns from (qualitative) evidence provided by
a domain expert, as well as evidence from trial and error. And thirdly, our model learns
unforeseen concepts and causal relations among them, while the U-tree algorithm does
not reason about which dimensions define the state space, nor their causal dependencies.
This third difference is related to the second: we ultimately want our model to enable an
agent to learn about the domain and how to behave in it from a human expert, and it is
quite natural for a human to justify why one state is different from another on the basis
of the concepts on which optimal behaviour depends by saying, for instance, “sandy soil
causes abundant barley yields”. Our model supports learning from this type of evidence.
Deep reinforcement learning (drl, Mnih et al. (2015)) also aims to learn a suitable
abstraction of the data to enhance convergence towards optimal policies. drl combines
deep learning (i.e., a convolutional neural network or cnn (Bengio et al., 2013; Hinton
et al., 2006)) with rl, and has proven extremely useful (e.g., Chouard (2016)). However,
the major successes in drl have not so far considered changing state-action spaces in
the sense of the examples we have discussed. Instead, the focus has been on using a
large number (typically, in the millions or tens of millions) of domain trials to re-describe
a large state-action space in terms of abstracted versions that render policy learning
more tractable. We believe that agents can learn more efficiently if they exploit evidence
from both domain trials and messages conveyed by an expert. Unfortunately, expert
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evidence about causal relations (“X causes Y”) or preference (“If C is true, then doing
X is better than doing Y”) are inherently symbolic. Adjusting weights in a sub-symbolic
representation like a cnn so that it satisfies certain qualitative properties is currently an
unsolved problem. Another limitation is that the implicit models generated by drl lack
explainability—they are unable to elaborate on why a given action was recommended
over another. Our approach complements methods like drl by dynamically building an
interpretable model of the decision problem. Such interpretable models make it easier
for the agent to explain the reasons behind a given decision, and also allow the agent to
evaluate its interpretation of expert messages against its current conceptualisation of the
decision problem via the standard logical technique of model checking.
The agent must learn how to revise its model of the decision problem to incorporate
newly discovered actions and concepts. Hence, part of our task is to learn the domain’s
causal structure. Several approaches exist for jointly learning causal dependencies and
probability distributions (e.g., Bramley et al. (2015); Buntine (1991); Friedman (1998))
and exploiting causal structure to speed-up inference (Albrecht and Ramamoorthy, 2016).
We extend this work to meet our objectives. First, models for learning dependencies all
assume that the vocabulary of random variables does not change during learning, but in
our task it changes when the agent becomes aware of an unforeseen action or concept.
Secondly, optimal action depends on payoffs as well as beliefs, and so we must integrate
learning dependencies with learning potential payoffs. Finally, Bramley et al. (2015) and
Friedman (1998) use only domain trials as evidence, and although Buntine (1991) uses
expert evidence, the messages are only about causal relations and they are all declared
prior to learning. In contrast, we want to interleave dialogue and learning: this enables
the expert to offer advice in a timely and contextually relevant manner; consequently,
she can explain particular outcomes and correct mistakes.
The dns used to model the decision problems in this paper resemble a simplified ver-
sion of influence diagrams (Howard and Matheson, 2005). Influence diagrams allow one
to express multi-stage decision problems by defining information arcs between chance
nodes and decision nodes, to help an agent assess whether it is worth observing a given
trial or not (known as a value-of-information calculation). There has been some work
on inferring the probabilistic structure and utilities of other agents in influence diagrams
(Bielza et al., 2010; Nielsen and Jensen, 2004; Suryadi and Gmytrasiewicz, 1999). How-
ever, as explained in Section 2, the added complexity of the influence diagram definition
was unnecessary to tackle the single-stage, fully observable tasks addressed in this paper.
Moreover, in our work we assume that the agent knows its own utility function.
There are several areas of research in which expert evidence is used to improve the
performance of a learning agent. In Transfer learning— where knowledge of the optimal
policy for a source task is used to improve performance on a related target task—the
transfer of knowledge is sometimes captured via an expert “giving advice” to a learner
(Torrey et al., 2006). Typically, both the source and target task must belong to the same
domain. If they do not, an explicit mapping is usually provided from the states and
actions in the source task to the states and actions in the target task. In contrast, our
agent incrementally learns a single task, but is occasionally made aware of new concepts,
which it must learn to accommodate into its existing knowledge. Another difference is
that in transfer learning, the expert advice is all declared before the agent begins learning.
In our model, the agent and expert engage in a dialogue throughout learning.
Knox and Stone (2009) use human expert evidence to inform rl, but they confine
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this evidence to updating the likely outcomes of actions and their rewards; they do not
support cases where expert evidence reveals information that the agent was not aware
was possible. On the other hand, researchers have developed models for learning optimal
policies via a combination of domain actions and natural language instructions, where the
instructions may include neologisms, whose semantics the agent must learn (e.g., Liang
(2005)). But this work assumes that the neologism denotes an already known concept
within the agent’s abstract planning language. On encountering the neologism “block” ,
for example, the agent’s task is to learn that it maps to the concept block that is already
an explicit part of the agent’s domain model. In contrast, we support learning optimal
policies when the neoglogism denotes a concept that the agent is currently unaware of;
e.g., to support learning when block is not a part of the agent’s conceptualisation of the
domain, and yet this (unforeseen) concept is critical to optimal behaviour.
Forbes et al. (2015) use embodied natural language instructions to support teaching
a robot a new skill (a task known as learning by demonstration). Their model learns how
to map a natural language neologism to what might be a novel combination of sensory
values—in this sense, the meaning of the neologism may be an unforeseen concept—and
this novel concept then informs the task of learning new motor controls. In effect, this
work links a rapidly growing body of research on learning how to ground natural lan-
guage neologisms in the embodied environment (known as the symbol grounding problem;
(Siskind, 1996; Dobnik et al., 2012; Yu et al., 2016; Hristov et al., 2017) inter alia) with
learning a new skill. But it does not support integrating the newly acquired skill into an
existing hypothesis space consisting of other actions, consequences and rewards; so they
do not support learning optimal policies when not only this new skill but other actions
(and related concepts) are needed as well.
Our aim in this paper is to supply a complementary set of learning algorithms to this
prior work. Like Forbes et al. (2015), our agent learns from both trial and error and from
instruction. But we focus on a complementary task: instead of focussing, as they do, on
learning how to execute a new skill, we focus on learning when it is optimal to execute
it. Given that we wish to support larger planning tasks, we also broaden the goals to
discovering and learning to exploit arbitrary unforeseen concepts, not just the learning
of spatial concepts that Forbes et al. (2015) are limited to (see also Dobnik et al. (2012)).
On the other hand, natural language ambiguity makes extracting the hidden message
from natural language utterances a highly complex process (Grice, 1975; Bos et al.,
2004; Zettlemoyer and Collins, 2007; Reddy et al., 2016). We bypass this complexity by
using a formal language as the medium of conversation. This formal language can be
broadly construed as the kind of language one uses to represent the output of natural
language semantic parsing (Artzi and Zettlemoyer, 2013). Replacing the expert that we
deploy in our experiments with an expert human would require linking the model we
present in this paper with existing work on grounded natural language acquisition and
understanding. This task is beyond the scope of the current paper, and forms a major
focus of our future work.
Lakkaraju et al. (2017) tackle learning “unknown unknowns” via interaction with an
oracle. This work addresses a specific type of unawareness: an agent assigns an incorrect
label to a trial with high confidence. Crucially however, they assume that the correct
label for this trial must be a label that the agent is already currently aware of. In other
words, they exclude the option that the hypothesis space itself is incomplete, which is
the type of unawareness that we are interested in.
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There is a growing body of work on modelling unaware agents (e.g., Feinberg (2004);
Halpern and Reˆgo (2013); Board et al. (2011); Heifetz et al. (2013)). These theories
predict when the agent’s unawareness causes it to deviate from what is actually optimal.
But with the exception of Rong (2016), this work does not address how an agent learns
from evidence: i.e., how to use evidence to become aware of an unforeseen factor and to
estimate how this gets incorporated into its updated conceptualisation of the decision
problem. We fill this gap. This prior work interprets awareness with respect to models
that include every possible option. A fully aware agent (e.g., the domain expert in
our experiments) or an analyst can model an unaware agent this way, but it does not
characterise the unaware agent’s own subjective perspective (Li, 2008). In contrast, our
learning task requires the unaware agent to use evidence to change its set of possible
options: it dynamically constructs this set and its causal structure from evidence.
Finally, the barley example from Section 1 shows that becoming aware of an unfore-
seen possibility can prompt revisions, rather than refinements, to the reward function.
But the models that support preference revision on discovering an unforeseen possibility
assume a qualitative preference model (Hansson, 1995; Cadilhac et al., 2015). Following
Cadilhac et al. (2015), we use evidence to dynamically construct an ever more specific
partial description of preferences, and defeasible reasoning yields a complete preference
model from the (partial) description—the agent defaults to indifference. But unlike
Cadilhac et al. (2015), the learning agent uses evidence to estimate numeric payoffs
rather than qualitative preference relations.
7. Conclusions and Future Work
This paper presents a method for discovering and learning to exploit unforeseen possi-
bilities while attempting to converge on optimal behaviour in single-stage decision prob-
lems. The method supports learning by trial and error as well as learning by instruction
via messages from a domain expert. We model the problem as one of dynamically
building an interpretable conceptualisation of the domain: we argued that building an
interpretable model offers a straightforward way to exploit both the qualitative evidence
and the quantitative evidence. Specifically, our model is the first to support learning all
components of a decision network, including its set of random variables.
Our algorithms build upon the common sense notions of Minimality and Conservativ-
ity. Minimality is encoded in the following ways: greedy search for a minimal vocabulary
and domain for the reward function; defaulting to indifference; defeasibly low prior proba-
bilities of dependencies; and the assumption that any superset of a sufficiently improbable
parent set is at least as improbable. Conservativity is encoded by retaining the relative
likelihoods among dependencies and cpts learned so far when a new variable gets added
to the dn.
Our experiments show that these principles significantly enhance the performance of
the agent in its learning task, as measured by policy error and cumulative reward, when
learning a dn of 21 random variables from 3000 pieces of evidence. The model was also
shown to be robust to the topology of the true dn: in other words, it learns effective
policies, whatever the true conceptualisation of the domain might be. An agent that
starts with a minimal subset of the true hypothesis space is also competitive with one
that starts with full knowledge of the set of random variables that define the atomic
states.
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There are several novel formal components to our model. For instance, we have
combined symbolic constraint solving with Dirichlet distribution based estimates to guide
learning, and the novel ILP step ensures that the estimated causal structure of the domain
is valid—i.e., all nodes are connected to the utility node, and the dependencies satisfy all
observed evidence to date. This component on its own presents an important extension
to existing work on learning dependencies, since it supports learning a dn as opposed to
just a Bayesian network.
These are just the first steps towards building an agent that can learn to conceptualise
and exploit its domain via its own action and via messages from teachers or experts.
We would like to extend this model to handle decision problems where some of the
critical factors for solving the task have hidden values even after the agent becomes
aware of them; this would involve replacing our Parameter Update algorithm with a
modified version of Structural EM (Friedman, 1998). We would also like to extend it to
handle dynamic environments: i.e., to learn (factored) mdps, where the dns learned here
correspond to just one time slice. This would not only extend the scope of this work from
single-stage decision making to sequential planning; it would also be essential if we were
to replace defining the agent’s and expert’s dialogue strategy with learning an optimal
dialogue strategy. We would also like to enrich dialogue in three ways. First, we would
like the learner to utilise defeasible messages about likelihood. Second, we would like
to relax the assumption that the expert’s intended message is always true. And finally,
we would like to support dialogues in natural language—the latter two enhancements
are a necessary step for an agent to discover and exploit unforeseen possible options via
interaction with a human teacher.
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Appendix
The model for learning dn+ made use of a language L for partially describing dns.
Its syntax and semantics is defined as follows:
Definition 2. The syntax of the language L
• Terms of various sorts: X,Y . . . are random variable (RV) constants; ΠY ,
V, A, O, B are Sets of Random Variables (SRV) constants (denoting sets
of random variables in the model); where X is an RV constant, x is a
proposition term (we also say that ¬x is a propositional term); s is an
atomic state (AS) term (denoting an atomic state in the model). The
language also includes RV variables and AS variables.
• If p is a propositional term or an AS term, then it is a well-formed
formula (wff) in L.
• If p is a conjunction of positive and negative propositional terms and X
is an SRV constant, then p  X is a well-formed formula (wff) in L.
• If X is an RV term and Y is an SRV term, then X ∈ Y is a wff in L.
• If s is an AS term and n is a number, then R(s) = n is a wff in L.
• Where φ, ψ are wffs, so are ¬φ, φ ∧ ψ, ∃sφ, ∀sφ (where s is an AS
variable variable) and ?λV φ (where V is an RV variable).
Each model dn for interpreting L corresponds to a (unique) complete dn (see Defini-
tion 1). Definition 3 then evaluates the formulae of L as partial descriptions of dn.
Definition 3. The semantics of L
Let dn = 〈Cdn,Adn,Πdn, θdn,Rdn〉 be a dn and g a variable assignment
function.
• For an RV constant X, [[X]]〈dn,g〉 = X; similarly for SRV constants.8
This ensures that [[A]]dn,g, [[B]]dn,g and [[O]]dn,g denote sets of variables
in the appropriate position in the causal structure of dn.
• For an AS variable s, [[s]]〈dn,g〉 = g(s) where g(s) ∈ 2Cdn×Adn . For an
RV variable V , [[V ]]
〈dn,g〉
= g(V ) ∈ Cdn ∪ Adn.
• For an RV term a and an SRV term b, [[a ∈ b]]〈dn,g〉 = 1 iff [[a]]〈dn,g〉 ∈
[[b]]
〈dn,g〉
.
• Where p is a propositional term, [[p]]〈dn,g〉 = p.
• For an AS term s and number n, [[R(s) = n]]〈dn,g〉 = 1 iff Rdn([[s]]) = n.
8If X 6∈ Cdn∪Adn, then [[X]]〈dn,g〉 is undefined and Definition 3 ensures that any formula φ featuring
X is such that dn 6|= φ; similarly for propositional terms p featuring a value of a variable that is not a
part of dn.
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• Where p is a conjunction of positive and negative propositional terms
and X is a set constant, [[p  X ]]〈dn,g〉 = [[p]]〈dn,g〉  [[X ]]〈dn,g〉 (i.e., the
projection of the denotation of p onto the set of variables denoted by
X ).
• For formulae φ, ψ: [[φ ∧ ψ]]〈dn,g〉 = 1 iff [[φ]]〈dn,g〉 = 1 and [[φ]]〈dn,g〉 = 1;
[[¬φ]]〈dn,g〉 = 1 iff [[φ]]〈dn,g〉 = 0; [[∃sφ]]〈dn,g〉 = 1 iff there is a variable
assignment function g′ = g[s/p] such that [[φ]]〈dn,g
′〉
= 1.
• Where V is a RV variable and φ is a formula:
[[?λV φ]]
〈dn,g〉
= {φ[V/X] : X is an RV constant and [[φ[V/X]]]〈dn,g〉 =
1}.
These interpretations yield a satisfaction relation in the usual way: dn |= φ iff there is a
function g such that [[φ]]
〈dn,g〉
= 1.
Derivation of Parameter Update Given a Domain Trial
We now show that (21)—the formula for incrementally updating the probability of
a parent set given the latest domain trial—follows from the recursive Γ function in the
Dirichlet distribution.
Pr(Πv|e0:t) = Pr(Πv|e0:t−1) (nv=i|j+αv=i|j−1)(nv=.|j+αv−.|j−1) (21)
Exploiting the Dirichlet distribution to compute the posterior probability yields the fol-
lowing, where mv is the number of possible values for variable V (so in our case, mv = 2):
Pr(Πv|e0:t) ∝ Pr(Πv)
∏
j∈values(Πv)
Betamv (nv=1|j + αv=1|j , . . . nv=mv|j + αv=mv|j)
Betamv (αv=1|j , . . . , αv=mv|j)
If et makes V = i, Πv = j, then the only term in the product that differs between
updating with e0:t−1 vs. e0:t is when Πv = j. For e0:t−1, this term is:
Betamv (nv=1|j + αv=1|j , . . . , nv=i|j − 1 + αv=i|j , . . . , nv=mv|j + αv=mv|j)
Betamv (αv=1|j , . . . , αv=mv|j)
So
Pr(Πv|e0:t) ∝ Pr(Πv|e0:t−1) Betamv (nv=1|j+αv=1|j ,...nv=mv|j+αv=mv|j)Betamv (nv=1|j+αv=1|j ,...,ni|j−1+αv=i|j ,...,nmv|j+αv=mv|j)
= Pr(Πv|e0:t−1)
∏
k∈values(V ) Γ(nv=k|j+αv=k|j)
Γ(nv=.|j+αv=.|j)
Γ(nv=.|j−1+αv=.|j)
Γ(nv=i|j−1+αv=i|j)
∏
k∈values(V )\i Γ(nv=k|j+αv=k|j)
= Pr(Πv|e0:t−1) Γ(nn=i|j+αv=i|j)Γ(nv=.|j+mvαv=.|j)
Γ(nv=.|j−1+αv=.|j)
Γ(nv=i|j−1+αv=i|j)
By the definition of Γ (i.e., Γ(α) = (α− 1)Γ(α− 1)), we have:
Pr(Πv|e0:t) = Pr(Πv|e0:t−1) (nv=i|j−1+αv=i|j)Γ(nv=i|j−1+αv=i|j)(nv=.|j−1+αv=.|j)Γ(nv=.|j−1+αv=.|j)
Γ(nv=.|j−1+αv=.|j)
Γ(nv=i|j−1+αv=i|j)
= Pr(Πv|e0:t−1) (nv=i|j−1+αv=i|j)(nv=.|j−1+αv=.|j)

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Decision Networks Used in Experiments
Tables 4, 5, and 6 specify the true conditional probability tables (cpts) and reward
functions for the three Barley dns used in the experiments of section 5 (dnbest+ , dn
worst
+ ,
and dnbarley+ ). For each cpt, each row lists a variable’s name, its immediate parents,
and the probability of that variable having the value 1 given each possible assignment
to the variable’s parents (assignments are enumerated according to the order specified in
the second column). The reward table lists the reward domain and the reward received
given each possible assignment to the domain.
Table 4: dnbest+
X ΠX P (X = 1 |ΠX)
B1 B5 0.596, 0.774
B2 ∅ 0.653
B3 B7 0.457, 0.457
B4 ∅ 0.354
B5 B3, B4 0.639, 0.224, 0.35, 0.273
B6 ∅ 0.738
B7 ∅ 0.313
O1 O2, O6, A3 0.286, 0.478, 0.401, 0.956, 0.53, 0.084, 0.766, 0.923
O2 A1, A7 0.31, 0.554, 0.213, 0.197
O3 A2, A5, B2 0.74, 0.945, 0.92, 0.721, 0.371, 0.963, 0.129, 0.029
O4 B2, O5, B1 0.937, 0.93, 0.484, 0.255, 0.637, 0.191, 0.136, 0.149
O5 O7 0.36, 0.43
O6 A6, B5 0.677, 0.209, 0.696, 0.521
O7 A4, B6 0.821, 0.379, 0.211, 0.383
ΠR R(ΠR)
O1, O4, O3, O5, B7 43.55, 27.42, 35.48, 8.06, 20.97, 11.29, 30.65, 50.0, 46.77, 6.45,
12.9, 32.26, 41.94, 0.0, 33.87, 37.1, 25.81, 4.84, 22.58, 29.03, 14.52,
9.68, 45.16, 24.19, 17.74, 19.35, 48.39, 16.13, 40.32, 3.23, 38.71,
1.61
45
Table 5: dnworst+
X ΠX P (X = 1 |ΠX)
B1 ∅ 0.49
B2 B3, B7 0.779, 0.547, 0.727, 0.197
B3 ∅ 0.198
B4 ∅ 0.36
B5 ∅ 0.883
B6 ∅ 0.237
B7 B1 0.43, 0.992
O1 O7, A1, A3 0.088, 0.467, 0.13, 0.548, 0.7, 0.372, 0.498, 0.047
O2 B5, O7 0.461, 0.599, 0.806, 0.37
O3 A6 0.881, 0.125
O4 O3, A5, A4 0.111, 0.033, 0.315, 0.322, 0.034, 0.579, 0.94, 0.644
O5 O2, B4, O4 0.816, 0.979, 0.577, 0.467, 0.459, 0.751, 0.191, 0.541
O6 O4, A2 0.818, 0.583, 0.188, 0.957
O7 O6, A7, B1 0.314, 0.418, 0.48, 0.822, 0.957, 0.889, 0.697, 0.061
ΠR R(ΠR)
O1, B6, B7, O5, B2 43.55, 6.45, 22.58, 46.77, 37.1, 48.39, 1.61, 8.06, 16.13, 29.03, 50.0,
9.68, 11.29, 14.52, 19.35, 40.32, 4.84, 12.9, 38.71, 20.97, 45.16,
3.23, 32.26, 17.74, 33.87, 25.81, 24.19, 35.48, 27.42, 30.65, 41.94,
0.0
46
Table 6: dnbarley+
X ΠX P (X = 1 |ΠX)
Soil Type ∅ 0.5
Temperature ∅ 0.5
Precipitation ∅ 0.5
Insect-Prevalence ∅ 0.5
Local-Concern ∅ 0.5
Nitrogen Soil Type, Precipitation, Pesticide, Fer-
tiliser
0.4, 0.6, 0.5, 0.7, 0.3, 0.5, 0.4, 0.6,
0.65, 0.85, 0.75, 0.95, 0.55, 0.75,
0.65, 0.85
Gross Crops Harrow, Nitrogen, Grain 0.5, 0.4, 0.8, 0.7, 0.6, 0.5, 0.9, 0.8
Fungus Temperature, Fungicide, Grain 0.2, 0.5, 0.02, 0.04, 0.3, 0.6, 0.03,
0.06
Weeds Temperature, Harrow, Soil Type 0.2, 0.1, 0.02, 0.01, 0.3, 0.15,
0.03, 0.015
Infestation Insect-Prevalence, Pesticide 0.1, 0.5, 0.01, 0.05
Yield Gross Crops, Fungus, Weeds, Infesta-
tion
0.2, 0.95, 0.1, 0.5, 0.1, 0.7, 0.05,
0.3, 0.05, 0.65, 0.01, 0.2, 0.01,
0.45, 0.005, 0.1
Protein Nitrogen, Fertiliser, Grain 0.5, 0.9, 0.4, 0.8, 0.4, 0.8, 0.3, 0.7
Bad Press Local-Concern, Pesticide 0.0, 0.0, 0.01, 0.5
ΠR R(ΠR)
Yield, Protein, Fungus, Bad Press 10, 15, 15, 20, 0, 5, 5, 10, -10, -5, -5, 0, -20, -15, -15, -10
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